Tadeusz Kutrzeba

Russia’ craving for the sea

Every state that does not have enough material resources of its own, and therefore relies on exports and imports, must have a convenient route to the open sea, must have ports. All European states, with just very few exceptions, have their own access to the sea. Those that do not have access to the sea would like to have it and are striving with all their might to obtain it. Much like we wanted the Polish sea, Austria jealously guarded its right to Trieste, Hungary to Rijeka, Serbia was determined to reach the Adriatic, and Czechoslovakia would like the Hungarian corridor.

Russia has had similar appetite for the sea in general and for convenient and warm ports in particular. This craving, which is the result of an irresistible urge manifesting itself as a brute force, was the cause of many diplomatic and military quarrels with Russia in the past, has not ceased to exist to this day and therefore constitutes a possible cause of future discord. If we take a look at Russian history, we can see that, from very ancient times, the attraction to the open sea has been one of the main motives of Russian policy. Peter the Greati gave this idea concrete form by building the new capital city of St. Petersburg. The Baltic Sea is not completely free of ice all year round; besides, going out to the ocean can easily be threatened by enemies. Peter the Great, who was aware of the Baltic's shortcomings, was also the first to consider taking another route to a more convenient coast. He organized an expedition to India, but it failed to materialize for non-military reasons, much like the later expeditions under Catherine IIii and Paul I.

However, this craving has not ceased in spite of obstacles, and since the other neighboring seas, the Arctic Ocean and the Bering Sea, being covered with ice, were out of the question, and the ice-free Black Sea was and is closed by Constantinople, Russia set its sights on the Far East and India. Here, however, Russia’s craving clashed with the influence of Britain, which, convinced that it was only through its maritime power that it possessed importance and superiority over other states, saw Russia's intentions as a threat to its maritime sovereignty and made every effort to paralyze Russia's ambitions.

Russia, extending its influence towards Persia and China, worked its way to India's neighboring countries, winning concessions for the construction of railways, the establishment of colonies, etc. By this kind of peaceful conquest and acquisition of the country, Russia was preparing the ground for further, armed action. Thus, the northern parts of Persia and Afghanistan became Russia's “sphere of interest”. In Mongolia and Manchuria, however, Russia encountered a new adversary, Japan. The rivalry led to a war in which Russia lost its recently gained access to the open sea: Port Arthur. Stalled in the Far East, Russian expansion turned directly to India. Only the outbreak of the World War and its outcome saved Britain from a likely armed clash with Russia. Today's Russia, exhausted by revolution, incapable of any large-scale action, is an adversary that has temporarily lost significance. However, assuming that Russia's natural push towards the warm sea cannot be artificially curbed, it is interesting to examine the situation in which Russia found itself in 1920, after the revolution had been established and peace treaties with neighboring countries had been concluded. Under these treaties Russia lost a number of ports: with Finland, it lost Helsinki; with Estonia, it lost Reval; with Latvia, Riga and Liepāja. Ukraine, by adopting the Soviet system, gives Russia access to the Black Sea, but Russia cannot fully rely on the Caucasus ports on the Georgian coast. The state of possession in the Far East has changed and so far Vladivostok remains in Japanese hands. Before 1914 Russia was inclined to extend its possessions on the warm coast, and this aspiration led it to going to war with Japan in 1904 and later to diplomatic disputes with Britain; therefore, now that it has lost a considerable part of the Baltic coast, its aspiration for the warm coast will become even stronger, and will turn into a passion with which one must reckon and foresee its consequences.

So what are Russia’s roads leading to the sea? The Far East must be considered closed by a fait accompli and by force, the Baltic Sea, with the exception of Petrograd, is also closed by the Baltic States. This leaves open the road which Russia has been following since the Middle Ages and on which it has not yet been stopped by military force, i.e. the road through India to the Great Ocean. Acquiring India is possible either by means of a military expedition or through a political revolution in India. In the October 1921 issue of Bellona, in the article titled Walka o Indie (The Struggle for India), I argued that a Bolshevik military expedition to India was impossible because of the extraordinary operational difficulties arising from India's geographical position and the organizational deficiencies of Sovdepiya. Suffice it to say that the Russian army would have to have the supplies of food and materials for at least three months, that this army would have to number at least 270,000 men, and that the supplies would have to be carried by no fewer than a million camels or two million mules. Bearing in mind that after this long and difficult journey, the Russian army, having reached the borders of India, would be faced with the main task, i.e. beating the Anglo-Indian army, which before the World War numbered 297,000 men and which has excellent defensive conditions, one realizes that the possibility of the success of such an expedition is very faint.

Despite the reduction of British troops in India after the World War, the Bolshevik army in its present state cannot undertake an expedition to India. This is not to say that the Bolsheviks have renounced the idea of former Tsarist Russia of gaining access to the sea, they have merely chosen a different, less risky route: to make India Bolshevik.

The Revue Militaire generale (September 1921) published an article by Major Grassetiii entitled Angleterre et Russie, illustrating the history of Britain's rivalry with Russia in Central Asia. It shows the continuity of Russian policy from Peter the Great to the World War, now adopted by the Bolsheviks and pursued in Central Asia consistently and effectively. The Bolsheviks, following in the footsteps of the tsars, first of all seek to win over the neighboring countries, mainly Persia and Afghanistan, which they have largely succeeded in doing. At the same time they incite the Indian population against Britain and seek to secure the co-operation of the natives. Nationalist ideas and communist agitation against Europeans are warmly welcomed in India. A Muslim uprising in India and a revolt of the Indian army against Britain would tie up the regular British troops inside the country and would make it easier for the Bolsheviks to conduct a military intervention.

Is such a course of action possible? How is Britain behaving in the face of this? It is not trying to stop Russia from marching on India by force, but rather to counter Russia’s influence in Central Asia politically, and at the same time, it seems to me, to direct Russia's attention elsewhere, i.e. to the Baltic, to engage Russia in Europe by promoting its connection with the West, and thus to retain its own unrestricted freedom to act in Asia. This direction in Britain's policy is attested to by a number of facts: Britain opposes the creation of a big and strong Poland, as it has not recognized the Vilnius region and eastern Lesser Poland; besides, the Baltic states, such as Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, have not been so far recognized de jure. Britain, as if pointing to those weaker neighbors standing in Russia's way, is counting on Russia to take this line of seemingly lesser resistance. However, one must not delude oneself that the Baltic would satisfy Russia, proof of which is the policy of the pre-war years, when Russia owned the Baltic coast. When Britain looks into this issue, it will realize that the policy of Edward VIIiv , aiming to envelop the enemy, is the more appropriate one, and it will endeavor to use Japan, India, Romania, the Baltic States and Poland to forge a ring capable of restraining Russia's appetite threatening the general peace.

However, this solution involves the inevitable cause of future armed hostilities. If universal politics wants to prevent them under the principle of unifying the nations, it must allow Russia access to the sea without destroying the independent nations living on the coasts, or rather, with their consent, allow Russia to use ice-free ports. This would be a political attempt hitherto unpracticed, its outcome is therefore unknown.

Poland does not prevent Russia from reaching the sea, but preserving the freedom and independence of the newly created Baltic states cannot be worth less to Poland than satisfying Russia's wishes.

The article presented here was first published in Przegląd Współczesny No. 3 / 1922 (July), pp. 104-107.