Necessary Changes

Maurycy Mann

This month, the political program of the European states has been filled with issues important enough to occupy minds and uncertain enough to incite popular curiosity. Will the Paris Conference succeed in settling the Neufchatel issue1 to both parties’ satisfaction? And more importantly, will it manage to preserve the authority of the European tribunal of states, its irrevocableness, and protect the whole system from harm? What turn will the Danish-German issue2 take? Will it turn Denmark toward Scandinavism or will its recognition of the Bundestag’s superiority ensure a triumph of the German race, or will an intermediate way be found to settle this without going to extremes, to reconcile the idea of the state with the rights of the provinces — at least for some time?

Will the severing of diplomatic relations between Austria and Piedmont not lead to new repercussions? Will these countries’ mutual political relations not change in the face of the fight waged in the Turin Parliament by Count Cavour’s2 policy against the ultra-liberal party over the transfer of war arsenal and port from Genoa to La Spezia? How will Lord Palmerston4 deal with the liberal majority in the new parliament? Will he give in to the general pressure for reform? And if he takes initiative in this respect, when will that be: during the present or a future session? What effect will the House of Lords’ opposition have in the Prussian parliament? Will is not cross the line by protesting against almost all financial projects of the ministers? Will this manifested independence ultimately strengthen or weaken the parliamentary system in Prussia? Where will this new parliamentary attempt in the Danubian Principalities lead to? Can it be executed as the last year’s Congress of Paris wished for? Can this question of a merger or the status quo be resolved without infringing on the sultan’s rights, the terms of the treaty of 30 March,5 or, last but not least, the existing covenants? Will the Persian Shah4 end the war with England by ratifying the treaty between Farrokh Khan and Lord Cowley, and enable the English to pull back the troops they so badly need in the war with China?5 What part will other countries take in this war, especially France and America? Only diplomatic or backed with a military demonstration? What is the meaning of England’s wooing the United States? How to explain the speech given by Sir Napier,6 the English ambassador to Washington, who promised world domination to the Anglo-Saxon race, calling on Brother Jonathan to enter into a brotherly alliance with John Bull,7 in the context of the rejection of the changes which the U.S. Senate demanded from England in the Clarendon-Dallas Treaty?8 What is the meaning of the declaration made by Lord Palmerston at the parliament that Britain can look calmly at the forced seizure of the isthmus of Panama by the United States, if on the other hand the conflict which with the said treaty has just ended is to resume? Is Great Britain planning not to react either in the event of the Washington cabinet planning to seize Mexico or Cuba, as long as this hapless treaty is signed, or more importantly in the event of America wanting to become actively involved in the war with China? Does Russian antagonism frighten England more than the Yankees’ infamous greed?

Admittedly, each of these issues, and bear in mind that only the most important ones have been mentioned here, deserved a lot of the overall political interest. Let alone if we ventured into the realm of guesswork. Oh, how much material would the journeys of rulers and princes of the blood provide! A range of different conclusions can be drawn from the Holy Father’s visit to Loreto, the Austrian Emperor’s trip to Hungary, King Maximilian of Bavaria’s9 trip to Italy and France, Duke Konstantin’s10 trip to Paris and England, and Prince Napoleon’s11 trip to Berlin and Dresden! Will these trips partly replace diplomacy? Their frequency is increasing proportionally to diplomacy losing its former secrecy as well as its almost universal transformation into a kind of congress, if not a tribunal. Will trips made by eminent persons be a consequence of the shared principles and solidarity of interests, as in this system it is difficult for one state’s diplomacy to act separately, in secret, or — in a word — on its own? These shared principles and solidarity could pose a great obstacle to war, but are they not at the same time a difficulty when it comes to two powers’ reaching an agreement, away from public opinion? Every system has good and bad sides.

Probably all of these issues are important, because almost each of them can affect overall politics — they are all interesting, because they are uncertain and remain unsolved. And yet, amidst the multitude of tasks, doubts, and conjectures, public opinion, especially in the West, which is always a barometer of political interest anyway, has not debated any other issue more often, has not discussed any issue equally lively as that of… the railroad in Russia. The polemics that followed is worth a closer look. The railroad enterprise in Russia, that simple industrial business venture, that speculation grew into a first-order political issue. It was realized, particularly in England, where that enterprise encountered strong opposition, that the Russian railroad had specific and unique characteristics which other railroads do not. It was realized a bit too late that Russia was unlike other European states, that nothing, not even a slightest speculation could be done there without the government’s knowledge, because the Russia nation is powerless and only the authorities do act, and that consequently, every speculation has political significance because it is merely a tool in the hands of a most absolute government. It was noticed in time that Russia probably had a reason to expose herself to this rapid civilizational leap from the total lack of any means of transport to the railroads. Two years ago, when the first mention of the construction of railroads in Russia was made, attempts were made to show in the same periodical, that the Russian civilization was unsuitable for railroads, that Russia was merely on the level of paved highroads, of which there are none there. Transportation should be in harmony with the demand and movement, industrial and commercial. Everybody agrees that highroads would be sufficient for the Russian demand and movement. So when Russia skips this entire intermediate transportation stage and builds railroads, unintimidated by that great endeavor, the industrial advantages and commercial requirements cannot be the only stimulus. So now England is belatedly shouting at the top of her voice that the Russian railroads are purely strategic, military railways. Though it remains unknown whether this is their sole purpose, transport of troops is undoubtedly one of its aims... England failed to notice in time that Russia, taking advantage of the foreign capital’s work, is furnishing for herself a completely new position in Europe and that it is impossible to tell where the railroad can take Russia or what political consequences can the completed network of Russian railroads have in Europe.

It is probably no use arguing today like the English press is doing, that the public should not invest in the Russian railroad venture, because it is bad business, bad speculation, which will not benefit the West in any way. It is no use appealing to capitalists’ patriotism, urging them to invest their capital in national securities instead, or warning that the outflow of capital will depreciate national securities, etc. These and similar arguments sounds indeed strange considering the financial and speculative flow that prevails in the West. Who can say for sure whether the Russian railroad is good or bad business? This speculation is different from all others because it consists in introducing the railroad to lands where there are no roads, in enabling movement of millions of inhabitants who could travel only for a few months per year. This is totally unprecedented. The figures are almost impossible to collect. What shall come out of this? It remains unknown, because this realm is unknown. But are we not in a heroic period, one that is not for people but for credit? Does the unknown scare capital away? Not at all. Capital likes to throw itself into adventurous speculations. Imagination often mingles with speculation, and sometimes it is precisely the unknown sphere that promises most fantastic dividends… Besides, is today’s speculation, even at the initial moment, about the business itself, that is, the object of the speculation? Truth be told, it is only about the profit that the shareholders will make on the day when the shares enter the market, and there is always some profit. And whether speculation itself is good or bad hardly matters to anyone… Those who defend the railroad enterprise in Russia also have an easy answer to the allegation that the West will not benefit from the introduction of that means of transport. Suffice it to recall that Russia is one of the granaries of the West. A lot of grain goes to waste in Russia because delivery to Odessa and other ports is very difficult for lack of transportation or outright impossible for the most part of the year. This one remark almost suffices today, when the issue of food has become really vital for the West… Does it make sense to appeal to the capitalists’ patriotism, and in England at that, where all foreign enterprises are usually a source of profit for the natives? Capital will certainly not understand why it should be a patriot and lose money by not investing in the Russian railroads since it did not need to be a patriot with regard to railroads in other countries and ended up making a profit. French capital’s outflow to movable credit in so many countries was not feared, so why should this outflow be so dangerous in the case of the shares of the Russian railroad? Besides, there is no patriotism in speculation. Gold and silver are cosmopolitans. Capital sees its homeland where the profits are biggest. If Russia presents the benefits, she shall find capital. She shall find it even in England, where the opposition to this enterprise is strongest. And considering the forces at Russia’s disposal, the tax which she shall impose and collect without a murmur, the manual labor backed by serfdom and the troops, the abundance of material, the flat lay of the land suitable for railroads as well as many other regards and means at her disposal, one can agree with those who claim that if Russia wants to have the railroads, she shall have them, and that the screams of the English press and the unfavorable reasoning of some of the French press shall not stop her.

It is not surprising, that though late, the West, having seen through Russia’s plans for the railroad, discerned in that enterprise the first, tangible, and important (as it could be called European) change in the Russian state. Although this change was initiated in the material sphere, it can easily lead to a change of not only the entire government system, but of the state’s organism. No one has doubted that the Russian state has to change. In the history of every country there comes a time when changes become inevitable and when everyone can sense them beforehand, and as a common saying goes, albeit they are not yet visible, they are in the air.

For France, such a moment in the past century was the death of Louis XIV.16 After the king’s passing, everybody was certain that changes in France were inevitable. The France which Richelieu17 handed to Louis XIV was no longer a simple monarchy, but not yet a state. When Louis XIV uttered the memorable words: l’État c’est moi,18 he not only gave a definition for despotism, but also assessed his person. If France was a state under Louis XIV, then it was such through him. France still had provinces, which had their own laws, but Louis XIV replaced centralization with the prestige of the throne and majesty. France had nobility, but Louis XIV commanded that its pedigrees not be engraved on casques and shields, but embroidered on stools in Versailles. All the opponents who did not yield to his strength, willingly yielded to his glory. Louis XIV provided what France lacked to be a state. After his death, he had to be replaced. Changes had to occur. France could not go back to being a feudal monarchy, and she was still far away from a monarchy in the sense of a state. Probably no one knew that France would have to go through all the abuses of absolutism, that Law12 would ruin her before a revolution turned her into a state. Although perhaps no one had anticipated it, everyone was well aware that after Louis XIV’s death changes had to occur and very important ones at that. After the Empire, the Restoration, after Louis Philippe, and the Republic, no one could predict profound changes regarding France’s organism. France was a state, and all changes had to be limited to the form of her government. And this is exactly what happened.

If it were not for fear of comparison which cannot be made here unless we account for the immense differences in terms of the epoch, the state, and the persons — it could be said that the death of Emperor Nicholas21 was such a moment for Russia when everyone expected changes, though probably not even now anybody knows what direction they will take. Peter the Great22 adjusted Russia externally to the degree required by the then policy of states. Catherine23 elevated Russian civilization to the Western model, but only superficially. Inside, Russia remained motionless. She has always been a monarchy reigned by the despotism of Ivan the Terrible.24 It was difficult to preserve this anomaly on the outside and inside, and only the political direction of war and conquest set by Peter the Great gave the Russian monarchs the power to maintain this two-faced policy without upsetting the internal immovability. The reforms, if there were any, pertained only to the military. But with the constant expansion of the state’s borders; with the growing participation of foreigners, especially of the Germans, in the government; with the ever changing and increasingly clear form of Europe, both political and social, the Russian monarch’s task was becoming increasingly difficult. Emperor Nicholas felt that the most acutely. His figure made up for the deficiencies in the government. His iron will made up for the disunity in the country. The strictness of his rule and the fear of his person counterbalanced, to a certain extent, the immense malfeasance and erased the bad consequences of excessive distances. There was not a far-off place in his vast country which the fear of the tsar’s anger could not reach! So after his death, changes in the state seemed necessary, especially given that in the final years of his reign the monarch himself and all his subjects realized that neither the ruler’s strong will nor energy, nor the nation’s patriotism, nor the country’s resources could win the fight against modern civilization armed with all the means that the last fifty years have equipped it with...

Interesting in this respect is the letter by Mr. Pagodin,13 a Professor from Moscow, recently published in some European newspapers. Let me repeat here that the said discourse, or rather a proclamation, deserves attention only in this respect. For its largest part, namely the one that pertains to politics where the Professor goes through the events of recent years, the beginning of the Russo-Turkish conflict, and the European states’ actions during the war — this entire part is very weak and false. False, because the facts quoted are not true. Weak, because it is based on continuous mutual accusations. Today it is no use maintaining that all that Emperor Nicholas had in mind was the liberation of Christians in Turkey while keeping silent about his desire for an exclusive protectorate. It is no use claiming that he had the right to enter the Principalities; that he did that only for the good of Moldavia and Wallachia; that he did not want war because he entered those provinces with a small corps; that if he had wanted war, he would have arrived in Constantinople before the Western fleets arrived in the Bosphorus; while keeping silent about the fact that only the Turkish troops fought on the Danube and at Silistra and that the French fleet was on Salamis before Prince Menshikov26 had left Istanbul — all of this is already history, and the facts are as well known as human acts can be certain. But in politics, mutual accusations are not only futile, but even harmful, for they will not make the past come back but they will obscure judgment of the present. Apparently, this ingratitude toward Russia, of which Mr. Pagodin accuses Europe, blinds him to her present state. This is reflected in the way he presents the current political situation...

Nevertheless, interesting is the passage where Mr. Pagodin presents that Russia, who exerts her great power at the tsar’s order, who tires her brave troops with great parades, who delivers food and ammunition to the troops by oxen-drawn carts across a hundred miles down unbeaten track, and wages war using her army for which the railroad is being built in order to reduce the three-mile space! Russia wanted to uphold her European reputation. She wished to appear as a first-order country — and she did. But think about the sacrifices she made. About the worries that her monarch had. About the disappointments and trials that poisoned every day of Emperor Nicholas’ final years! Mister Pagodin says that they sensed that the emperor would not endure. His death did not surprise anyone. It could be expected...

Hence, some changes had to take place in Russia. The death of Emperor Nicholas, who was perhaps the only one in the whole country able to maintain the old state of affairs in the bestowed motionlessness, had to be an impulse for those changes. Everybody would say that they have not taken place yet. This is true but no one doubts that they have to occur. There is general relaxation. There are no new guidelines in any administrative sphere, and yet everyone feels that the old guidelines which are still in full force are already obsolete. Changes must take place as evidenced by public opinion, which did not use to speak up but now calls out embezzlement and bribery; by the dailies which are permitted to write something and mention the word “reforms;” and, finally, this is also evidenced, and perhaps best, by the quoted letter penned by Professor Pagdin living in Moscow and speaking on behalf of the Old Russians’ party…

But same as no one doubts that changes in Russia must occur, no one has guessed how this shall happen and what consequences they shall have. Because of the recent events14 Russia had to deem herself inferior to the Western civilization, which is what dailies give the most attention, albeit calling this a general movement that has been sweeping across Europe this century. But it must be admitted that the momentum for this movement originated in the West. In his proclamation, Mr. Pagodin also mentioned the changes he was wishing for, and as he was speaking on behalf of the faction that calls itself pure Russian, one could expect some program matching the Russian spirit. Nevertheless, although Mr. Pagodin’s article is directed against foreigners’ influence in Russia, that is against the German Russian subjects’ political influence in the government (as one can guess from the principle stated regrettingly in the article “that all nationalities should enjoy rights equal to those of the nation which conquered them” — the principle which Mr. Pagodin regards as great progress, and which is universally accepted, and in Russia even more so than elsewhere), one cannot see in the article the proper characteristic of the expected changes. Pagodin wants freedom of trade and industrial freedom. All his wishes apply to the nineteenth-century movement, the cosmopolitan and speculative movement. Speaking only of material changes, the esteemed Professor seems to have forgotten that freedom is an element that is not easily divided. Freedom of trade cannot do without other freedoms. Industry cannot flourish where there is no personal freedom. The English comprehended that incomparably better, voicing their opposition to the railroad enterprise. They see in this change a material thread, which is bound to effect many changes. The material changes shall force changes in the Russian system, which the government will have to adjust to. Hence, the difficulty in guessing the consequences. The Russian peasant cannot remain as he is today, not only in terms of freedom of trade, which Mr. Pagodin wishes for, but he must also change in the face of the locomotive. Perhaps the Moscow Professor knew that well but decided to only appeal for the lifting of duties as he expected that serfdom would also have to be abolished then… Will the pure Russian faction benefit from this? That is a different matter. But then Russia shall be a true state, and this is precisely what Europe has been wishing for.

There can be no doubt that this has been Europe’s wish... There was so much talk about that petrified northern barbarism incapable of anything but invasions and attacks on other countries; about that Chinese wall that surrounded Russia and barred entry to all ideas of progress and civilization! And when this barbarism is embracing civilization, doing almost a salto mortale by building railroads where there are not even any roads, when the Chinese wall collapsed and has become so non-existent that this barbarity invites foreign capital; in a word, when Russia wants to take the first step on this path of the nineteenth-century civilization, instead of support, she faces a cry of fear and resentment from the West. Is it because this is too big of a step? It is difficult to demand that Russia forever toy with the St. Petersburg-Tsarskoye Selo railroad!15 She was required to become harmonious with the European states, and the discord between her politics and the general system was constantly lamented. Today, when Russia takes her place in this “concert,” when she wants to hold a note in this general harmony, a note that is right for her and befits her, she faces opposition as if she wished to abuse her current situation. Is it a fear that this note would be deafening in this European concert like a bass drum? Is it Russia’s fault that she raises such concerns? Should she remain idle and not seek to acquire these means of civilization without which, as she has learned from experience, a state cannot do today?

Last year, the Congress of Paris recognized Turkey as a European state and rejoiced at Russian plenipotentiaries’ statement that Russia intended to move in the direction of civilization, jointly and in solidarity with other European states. As a European country, Turkey does not build railroads on her own but grants licenses, predominantly to the English. Russia is inviting foreign capital to build railroads on her territory. Why the discontent? Despite all the forms and treaties, public opinion is convinced that Turkey is not a state only insofar as other European states maintain her, while Russia is a power where the railroad can have profound and unforeseen consequences for Europe. Inde irae16… But before Europe began to wish for changes in Russia and foster them, Europe should have considered the consequences. Now it is too late.

Footnotes

King Frederick VII of Denmark made efforts to annex Schleswig, Holstein, and Saxony-Lauenburg, which he ruled under a personal union. Those principalities, however, belonged to the German Confederation and the Danish plans met with fierce opposition from those who played a leading role in the Prussian Confederation, who were supported by German public opinion. The Danish-Prussian conflict climaxed in 1864, during the reign of Frederick VII’s successor, Christian IX, when there was a war between Denmark and a coalition of Prussia and Austria. The Danes were defeated, and the victors divided the principalities between themselves. Austria received Holstein, but after the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, the triumphant Prussians took control of both principalities and incorporated them into their borders as the province of Schleswig-Holstein.
Camilo Benso di Cavour (1810‒1861) — Count, one of the main architects of the unification of Italy. Prime Minister (1852‒1859 and 1860‒1861) of the Kingdom of Sardinia (Piedmont) and the first Prime Minister after the unification of the Kingdom of Italy (1861).
That is the Treaty of Paris.
Naser al-Din Shah Qajar (1831‒1896) — Shah of Persia of the Qajar dynasty, ruled since 1848, assassinated.
The Second Opium War (1856‒1860) — Great Britain, the United States, and France’s armed intervention in China; ended in the Western countries and Russia’s acquisition of trade privileges in China. Britain occupied the southern part of the Kowloon Peninsula.
Francis Napier (1819‒1898) — Scottish diplomat; UK ambassador to the USA (1857‒1859), the Netherlands (1859‒1860), Russia (1861‒1864), and Prussia (1864‒1866); Governor of Madras (1866‒1872); interim viceroy of India (1872); and member of the House of Lords.
Brother Jonathan and John Bull — stereotypical, exaggerated personifications of Americans (mainly from New England) and the English, respectively.
The Dallas-Clarendon Treaty was signed in London on 17 October 1856 by U.S. Ambassador to London George M. Dallas and British Foreign Minister Lord Clarendon. It was supposed to settle the British-American conflict in Central America — the British were to withdraw from the Honduran Bay Islands and the Mosquito Coast. The treaty sparked protests in the U.S. Senate and was not approved by President James Buchanan.
Maximilian II (1811‒1864) — King of Bavaria (1848‒1864) of the House of Wittelsbach. Tried to secure his kingdom’s independence in the face of the Prussian attempts to dominate the German states, but proved unable to stop them.
Konstantin Nikolayevich of Russia (1827‒1892) — brother of Tsar Alexander II, Governor of the Kingdom of Poland during 1862‒1863, admiral of the Russian fleet, and supporter of internal liberal reforms in Russia.
Napoléon-Jérôme Bonaparte (1822‒1891) — son of Hieronymus Napoleon, Napoleon I’s youngest brother, called Prince Napoléon or Plon-Plon. Member of Parliament with great political temperament, associated with the left. Advised his cousin, Napoleon III, on a number of issues which were of key importance for the state, although he was critical of many aspects of his reign.
John Law (1671‒1729) — Scottish economist and financier, regarded as the inventor of credit money. One of the originators and executors of a joint enterprise of the French Mississippi Campaign and the Royal Bank. The money invested in the shares was to be used for investments in the French colony of Louisiana. The expected huge profits occasioned an investment boom. When it occurred that the actual revenues were much smaller, the speculative bubble burst. The 1720 crash coincided with Law’s promotion to the position of the general financial controller of France, but the events on the stock exchange led to his fall — he had to flee France. Died impoverished in Venice.
Mikhail Pogodin (1800‒1875) — Russian historian, journalist, writer, pan-Slavism ideologist, propagator of the Great-Russian ideology, Moscow University Professor member of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences, publisher of the periodicals Moskovskij vestnik (1827‒1830) and Moskvitian (1841‒1856).
That is, in the Crimean War.
Tsarskoye Selo is a baroque palace and park complex, the tsars’ residence located approx. 25 kilometers from St. Petersburg. Located nearby was a railway station built in 1836, the final station of the 27-kilometer-long Tsarskoye Selo Railroad — the first railroad line in the Russian Empire from St. Petersburg.
Inde irae (Latin) — reason for anger.