European Interests and the Law of the Stronger

Maurycy Mann

Europe wishes for peace. There is no need to prove that. It is enough to look at what is happening, at the direction of public opinion, at the movement in the financial and industrial world, at how current political issues are judged by all social strata — with very little exception. As soon as an issue appears on the political horizon, there immediately arises the question as to whether it or its repercussions will break the peace. It is a common question and also the only one. Answering it is the only thing that occupies people’s minds, moves stock exchanges, and restrains businesses. The answers are becoming a barometer for all interests, not only the public, general, and more considerable ones, but even for the private, special, and tiniest ones. This question is the only thing that matters: the political side of issues is left to diplomacy, while the legal side is left to dreamers and dailies.

No one cares, no one even asks who will eventually keep the Snake Islands1 or who will retain Bolhrad.2 It does not matter whether it is Turkey or Russia, as long as someone yields and the dispute vanishes... Who cares whether the Danubian Principalities merge into a single entity or remain as they are today? Who cares whether Turkey has only the superior right of fief or serfdom? Who cares whether the Principalities have a right to demand unification? It does not matter even who is in favor of such a turn of events or who opposes it — provided that the matter is settled as soon as possible and ceases to be a bone of contention... Who cares whether Montenegro’s demands are satisfied or what fate awaits the Slavs who remain under the Ottoman scepter. There are no Slavophiles today, just as there are no more philhellenes to demand the evacuation of the allied troops from the Peloponnese. The French and English ships could dock forever in the port of Piraeus3 if this gives even a slightest guarantee for lasting peace in the East. The independence of Greece is completely secondary to peace in Europe....

Moreover, there are no more political philanthropists or negrophiles. The whole American question is reduced to the election of the President of the United States. It does not matter who is elected: Fillmore4 or Fremont,5 or whether the party which supports or opposes slavery prevails in the New World as long as elected is a man whose way of thinking, opinions, and especially rule is the least problematic and troublesome for the relations with the Old World, which yearns for peace. It would perhaps greatly benefit mankind if there were no corsairs, if America accepted the humanitarian principle proclaimed at the Congress of Paris6 which outlawed legalized piracy in the future! Why, the Americans could even keep the right to issue letters of marque and reprisal as long as this does not lead to a naval war....

It cannot be denied that such reasoning is practical and logical. But it seems that today in Europe one would not find, even with Diogenes’7 lamp, a participant of the general social movement, who, as they say, would be passionate about any political issue for the sake of principles. The past political principles have ceased to constitute the foundation of society’s government — they have become a tool. Having absorbed them in its immensity, the notion of state uses them freely; they are a means for it — never an end. Thus, the form of government is completely immaterial. Will there be a constitution in Spain or not; will it be the 1837 one or the 1845 one or a completely new, decreed one — who cares? Let O’Donnell6 or Narváez7 be at the government’s helm. It does not matter as long as Spain complies with the requirements of the present political system, joins the other states, does not start an armed intervention, and, last but not least, does not become a cause for war.... Who cares whether the King of Prussia maintains his rights to the Canton of Neuchâtel as long as he maintains it without severing his relations with the Swiss Confederacy, without shaking Europe on that account. Let the King of Naples declare an amnesty or refuse it altogether; let him carry out judicial reforms or make no changes whatsoever as long as the demonstrations announced or made have no repercussions that could disturb the peace… For, last but not least, few are concerned with the right of intervention or non-intervention, but everybody is concerned with maintaining peace.

In spite of all journalistic polemics, the strictest reasoning, and historical or social argumentations; in spite of the arguments from treaties or theories from public law; in spite of the Grotiuses8 and the Pufendorfs9 — this is the actual main current of public opinion with little exception to it, as stipulated above. This is a general current. It manifests itself everywhere, in part even where matters are pending, that is, in the theaters of disputes. Almost universally it does not matter what course a matter takes. Only the final result matters, and only as a factor affecting the general European policy, that is the issue of peace. Each matter taken individually and all of them together are less acute to public opinion as long as they cannot break the peace, no matter what happens, than the current crisis in France alone. This tells an impartial observer quite a lot about the situation.

This direction of the minds is an inevitable consequence of the present form of society, of the course of its advancement, its development tendencies, and the sphere where action is still possible. It matches the political system which has emerged from the idea of state. The deeper this system penetrates the society, the more it infuses itself into its elements and transforms them in a single uniform fashion, blurring old traditions and differences, cosmopolitalizing customs and concepts, bending them in one direction and fostering their uniform movement — the more indifferent the society must become on the one hand, the more it must wish for peace on the other hand. This fervent wish in the present state of society is already turning into a demand. Soon, it shall be a social need, and eventually it would have to become a necessity if the consequences indicated by the mind were the world’s destiny and the fulfillment of calculations were mankind’s task.

Howbeit everyone knows that most accurate calculations are wrong, that the most astute predictions fail, that reason and experience fail too when it comes to the course of political events. It is ultimately decided by someone higher up. Public opinion still clearly remembers that when the Russo-Turkish dispute began, almost no one suspected war and, more importantly, no one wanted it. But all combinations came to no avail; all attempts proved futile. The war did break out and it lasted two years against the governments’ will and against the European community’s aspirations.

Hence, the constant fear of breaking peace accompanies the said fervent wish for its greatest possible permanence. This fear may be more pronounced at present than before the eastern war; for the need for peace is unequally greater. As the need grows, so does the demand. It is an inevitable principle, both in the economic and political sphere. Here the two of them are tightly bound together. The political system developed at the Congress of Paris through the adoption of the principle of European states’ solidarity. It impeded the outbreak of the war, but at the same time the European community proceeded in equal measure down the speculative-industrial path. It might even have gone too fast and too far than the system allowed, or at least farther than it could extend its protection over it at that time. The social movement directed at boldest enterprises and speculations, seems to constitute quite a difficulty for diplomacy in dealing with the current affairs. Leading to unexpected results and crises, even if it does not completely tie the cabinets’ hands, then it at least leads to constant hesitation and delay. Everything remains in limbo.

Albeit these delays, these interruptions to action amidst the incessant negotiations, necessary for diplomacy, which, after all, cannot completely ignore the respice finem10 maxim, and which could be expected after the Treaty of Paris, which did not resolve any issue decisively or ultimately, do worry the minds a little. But these delays are almost always welcomed by public opinion with a certain degree of satisfaction. For it sees every such delay not only as a prolongation of peace, but also as a certain guarantee of its maintenance. The proverb says that all is not lost that is delayed. But public opinion is of the opposite opinion, and in politics experience proves it right. A special instinct makes public opinion nestle under the wings of this solidarity system, as it rightly senses that it naturally hinders an outbreak of war. Evey issue, no matter how small is viewed in light of this system. The issue assumes enormous proportions, assuming the size of a European interest. Then public opinion sees no solution to this matter other than a congress and brings it before Europe’s highest tribunal. It ignores the fact that in this proceeding disappear not only nationalities, because there is no mention of them, but even states. This is their essence: supreme authority and independence. Public opinion is just glad that in this way entire Europe constitutes one state, which cannot declare war on itself. Hence, there is peace… By the same token, public opinion closely observes and carefully analyzes all the symptoms regarding the existing covenants: not because it cares much about their preservation, but because it regards them as a means to keep at bay and reduce any probability of war. Public opinion would gladly accept other ones, if only it could be certain that they would be more beneficial to civilizational tendencies, which, according to it, depend on the maintenance of peace… As far as current affairs are concerned, public opinion eagerly clutches at any sign of this political solidarity, caring less about whether many powers’ joining a dispute is a simplification or a new complication — for public opinion does not care either about the dispute itself or a solution to it. All it asks itself is whether it will continue to enjoy peace. And this question is all the more sensitive as, having elevated every matter to the level of a European interest, public opinion feels all too well that should this matter lead to war, the war would have to have the same characteristic: it would be a European war. This is the reverse of the system, which, like every thing, must have two sides.

It is easy to understand that considering this peaceful disposition, Prince Gorchakov’s11 circular letter must have made an unpleasant impression on the public. And again, it does not matter that the style of the circular letter differs from that of ordinary diplomatic notes and is much more straight-forward — this is a thing of the St. Petersburg Chancellery… Nor does it matter that the circular letter cannot base its reasoning on Russian history, on Russian past or most recent policies; that while the completely new political direction set in this act is in keeping with the tradition of the Russian autocrats as far as the autonomy of the supreme head of state is concerned, it does not align with the policies of Peter the Great, Catherine II, and Emperor Nicholas as far as intervention principles are concerned… It is immaterial even that the circular letter was sent from Moscow precisely when the representatives of the system of political solidarity between states were trying to outmatch one another at coronation ceremonies, when they were competing over which of them would contribute more to an inauguration of a new peace with Russia… But it is important that the circular letter regards the application of the right to intervene under the solidarity system as a triumph of the law of the stronger and protests against it, support its protest with a mention of disposing of the state’s material forces.

Thus, it is not that Russia is expected to declare war over Greece or Naples, nor does public opinion in Europe fear war with Russia at this time. The eastern war is not yet distant past — the day of 16 January, when Russia accepted the allied powers’ propositions is still too recent. But to invoke the law of the stronger, the law the execution of which has almost always entailed war; to show it in the present system in the same light as in the past, same as always, despite treaties and congresses, despite civilizational strivings and advances; to show the law of the stronger after the Treaty of Paris, to show it as it was at the end of the last century and at the beginning of the present century — in a different form, under a different slogan and guise, but without changing its substance, namely as the coercion of the weaker by the stronger with the use of force; the outright denial of the principle that European states, even jointly, have a right to impose their will on a state as regards the autonomy and dignity of the supreme authorities (and any dispute over these must touch upon these) has always shaken the construction of the political system on which hopes for peace have been pinned. Prince Gorchakov’s circular letter made it clear that Russia does not recognize that “the European interest” should be the supreme statute in public law — suprema lex esto. In some respects the Russian minister reduced the policy of states to the principles of the old policy of nations, applying what used to be said about nations to supreme heads of states, whom he makes the sole and supreme judges of states’ interests and to all of whom, both the strongest and the weakest ones, he grants an equal right coming from God in that respect. According to him, this law can be violated perhaps only under the right of the stronger and it is always a violation, whether perpetrated by one state or by a tribunal made up of several states.

Albeit the idea of the state has been transforming into the political system mainly on the basis of the law of the stronger, and since the Reformation at that, that is, since the Treaty of Westphalia, as demonstrated in the past and also at length herein, this law, as theoretically contrary to civilization, gradually went out of use in political acts. Having obtained citizenship in public law, civilization did not allow application of that law, condemning it as a relic of barbarism and the Middle Ages. But as that law continued to exist, and to such an extent that it was exercised the most frequently and overtly in the name of that same civilization — it proved necessary to give it a different name in political acts, diplomatic notes, and treaties, a name more in keeping with the idea of the state and the new shape which the European community was taking, that is a name more in line with the “spirit of the epoch and progress.”

It must be admitted that European journalism has done a great service to diplomacy in this respect. Without going too far back in time, and leaving aside the end of the last century and the Napoleonic era, where cannons played a more important role than diplomatic notes and newspaper disputes, immediately after the Treaty of Vienna, where the system of states became more prominent, emerged the very frequently used expression: “the state’s best interest.” Journalists rightly wrote about “interests” instead of “rights,” for indeed with the collapse of the politics of nations, interest usually replaced law. But the “best interest” has always been a guise for threatening to use the law of the stronger. The journalists giving advice to any foreign state in that form should have guessed that their advice, lacking support from the government, was worthless, because every foreign minister certainly understood the state’s interest better than all of them put together. But initially they did not notice the momentousness of that expression, which was convenient, had the colors of civilization, and soon entered cabinet notes.

There it naturally took on a different meaning. It proved “that the interest of this or that state was understood differently by another state,” meaning that “the former state misunderstood its own interest,” and, last but not least, that “the former state had to understand its interest in keeping with that latter state’s wish, desire, or demand.” Obstinacy led to war, and it was about who was stronger. The weaker one gave up, namely “understood his own interest.” The law of the stronger was the only thing that settled such disputes. The Dutch king “misunderstood the interests of his state” in 1833 and the French troops approached Antwerp. Sultan Mahmud12 “misunderstood Turkey’s interests” in 1828 and Field Marshal Dybicz13 crossed the Balkans and occupied Adrianople. Today, the “best self-interest” would command the King of Naples to give in and do what the Western states expect from him… But today not only “the best self-interest,” but also “the European interest” require that he give in.

In fact, with the political system of states increasingly developing toward European solidarity, and with the community’s ever-increasing cosmopolitan aspirations in the field of industry and speculation, the “interest” was taking on an ever more general, more universal character — it was becoming a “European interest.” Every issue began to be regarded from that standpoint — a standpoint appropriate to both the political system and the society’s desires. If an interest is important, it must be European. As this expression entered diplomatic notes to such an extent that it can be considered a foundation of today’s cabinets’ actions and a political principle — the form in which the law of the stronger manifested itself has changed slightly but in its essence has remained unchanged. It is no longer about a state “understanding its own best interest” in some dispute, but about it recognizing the moot point as a “European interest.” And if it recognizes it as such, it must accept the demand made in the name of that interest, because the self-interest of the individual state cannot be separated from the general interest, from the interest of the whole of Europe. The European interest is an expression of cosmopolitanism in the system of states. Hence, nowadays, it is only about “recognition,” that is granting this characteristic to every issue, and when this happens, the whole thing is over.

However, when this very characteristic cannot be clearly defined or indisputably determined; when opinions, not only individual, but also those of a cabinet, may differ in this respect; when a demand made or required by one or even a few states as necessary for the European interest may seem totally unnecessary to the state which it concerns, or even at odds with the European interest — then here too there is need for a judge, or rather an executor. For the decree alone is not enough. What is needed is execution, coercion. Hence, the decision is always made by way of the law of the stronger. The Greek and Neapolitan kings do not believe that the occupation of the Peloponnese by allied troops and the judicial reforms in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies are European interests. But the Western powers think so, and that is why the French-English flag is still flying in the port of Piraeus and threatens to appear in the Gulf of Naples.

In recent years, Russia has been the most affected by the ultimate consequences of the principle known as “European interests.” It seemed to her that “Turkey’s best interest” required that Russia alone had protectorate over the Christians under the Ottoman scepter, that it was exercised by her and belonged to her exclusively, and was granted to her by way of a treaty. Turkey, on the contrary, thought that that would be her [Turkey’s] undoing. Foreign powers took to the stage of the dispute on behalf of the European civilization and interests, which soon appeared in the East in a larger number than the initial number of points in the Russo-Turkish dispute. “Recognition” was requested of Russia and when it was not received, the war broke out.

After one campaign, at the Vienna Conferences, Russia recognized, with considerable difficulty, that the independence of Turkey as a state was a European interest. Consequently, Russia had to give up her exclusive protectorate over the Danubian Principalities, which she already enjoyed, and her exclusive protectorate over the Christians subordinate to Turkey, which she was after. She did recognize that all the great powers’ protectorate over the Danubian Principalities and over the Turkish raiyah were European interests. Nevertheless, the war continued, because there emerged other European interests which Russia refused to accept.

After the second campaign, Russia recognized the neutrality of the Black Sea as a European interest, and consequently agreed to limit her rule of those waters and categorically remove her dominant Black Sea fleet. She also recognized freedom of navigation on the Danube as a European interest, as a result of which she relinquished a part of Bessarabia.

Russia paid for recognizing each of the “European interests” with some of the rights she had already acquired — never mind how she had acquired them but they were guaranteed by treaties. For satisfying every demand made in the name of such an interest she had to make a sacrifice, which, after all, was to the allied powers’ advantage. For even though the policy of the latter was characterized by disinterestedness, because they were not acting for themselves, but for the whole of Europe, and the Congress of Paris did not announce winners or losers among its participants and announced rewards for voluntary concessions — the basis for the conferences set up was always the ultimatum adopted by Russia after the two years of the bloody, persistent, and costly war.

Hence, it is no wonder that having experienced the consequences of the “European interests” principle and having seen what law they are ultimately based on, even in the system of the solidarity of states, Russia draws her foreign agents’ attention to this side of the system, because of the current affairs, and expresses her point of view with a certain irritability and unusual openness. But a stranger thing (if it is true) is that Russia is proposing a new congress because of the Neapolitan issue. Unless she is hoping to conclude to her advantage some of the issues that have been in suspension, or to take a new position during that congress on the “European interests” principle. This would be implied by the circular of 2 September, if indeed it is to be the program of the future policy of Emperor Alexander.

However unpleasant impression the Russian message must have made on public opinion, exposing the weaker side of the political system based on the Treaty of Paris, the side carefully concealed under the guise of civilization but very natural, like a handicap of a human body hidden under skillfully tailored dresses — this impression has always been moderated by a conviction that the law of the stronger will not so easily turn into a war when declaring it requires a consent of several states. A dispute must then remain on the diplomatic path for longer. Therefore, the system of solidarity always gives a certain guarantee of peace. Only the future can show to what extent the form will be able to replace the essence of things in the political relations under the new system.

Footnotes

Snake Island, Zmiinyi Island — island in the Black Sea, near the Danube Delta, now in Ukraine, formerly in Romania, which ceded it to the USSR in 1948.
Bolhrad — town in Ukraine, Odessa Oblast, founded in 1821 by Bulgarian settlers, back then in Russia, during 1856‒1878 within the borders of the Moldavian Principality.
The port of Piraeus was blocked by the British and French fleets during the Crimean War, when King Otto I of Greece decided to take Russia’s side.
Millard Fillmore (1800‒1874) — American politician, U.S. Vice President during 1849‒1850, U.S. President during 1850‒1853. In 1856, a presidential candidate of the Know Nothing party; voted third in the popular vote.
John Frémont (1813‒1890) — American military man, traveler, military governor of California (1847) and senator from that state (1850‒1851), governor of Arizona Territory (1878‒1881), famous for pioneering expeditions to the American frontier. In 1856, ran for U.S. President, but lost the election to James Buchanan. During the American Civil War, fought on the side of the North but came into conflict with his superiors, including President Abraham Lincoln.
Diogenes of Sinope (ca. 413‒ca. 323 B.C.) — Greek philosopher, Cynic, student of Antisthenes and teacher of Crates of Thebes, known for his radicalism and strange behavior.
Ramón María Narváez y Campos (1800‒1868) — Spanish military man and politician, 1st Duke of Valencia, Baldomero Espartero’s opponent, seven-time Prime Minister of Spain (1844‒1846, 1846, 1847‒1849, 1849‒1851, 1856‒1857, 1864‒1865, and 1866‒1868).
Hugo Grotius (1583‒1645) — Dutch philosopher and lawyer, considered the creator of international law, author of On the Law of War and Peace (1625), he dealt with, among others, natural law and social contract.
Samuel Pufendorf (1632‒1694) — German historian and legal scholar, Heidelberg University and Lund University Professor. Historiographer of King Carl Gustav of Sweden and then of Brandenburg. Considered creator of international law and natural law, as well as an advocate of absolutism. His works include De Jure Naturae Et Gentium Libri Octo (1672) and Einleitung zur Historie der vornehmsten Reiche und Staaten (1682‒1686).
Respice finem (Latin) — consider the end. Qquidquid agis prudenter agas et respice finem — whatever you do, do it wisely and consider the end.
Alexander Gorchakov (1798‒1883) — Russian diplomat and politician. Worked in diplomacy since 1817, since 1856 as Foreign Minister. During the Crimean War (1853‒1856), frustrated Prussia and Austria’s joining the anti-Russian coalition. During the January Uprising, prevented Napoleon III from organizing an international conference on the Polish issue. Advocate of Russian-Prussian cooperation. In 1879, ceased to lead the ministry, but was not formally dismissed until 1882.
Mahmud II (1785‒1839) — Sultan of the Ottoman Empire from the Ottoman dynasty, ruled the Empire during 1808‒1839, reformer of the state (among others, abolished the Janissary corps), struggled with an uprising in Greece, lost the war against Russia, and fought against Pasha of Egypt Muhammad Ali. Mahmud II was forced to recognize the independence of Greece, the autonomy of Moldavia and Wallachia, and the loss of Algeria to France.
Graf Ivan Ivanovich Dibich-Zabalkansky (1785‒1831) — his victory title of Zabalkansky commemorated his crossing of the Balkans, Russian Field Marshal, participant of the wars against Napoleon’s France and Turkey, led the troops suppressing the November Uprising.