Ignacy Matuszewski 

Russian policy towards Poland and other states

The road to Soviet control of Europe is blocked by Polish resistance.

Militarily between Europe and the Soviets still stands the German army. But politically between the Soviets and Europe stands Poland.

That is why the Soviets are not fighting the Germans politically. Rather, they seem to play with them. This is proved by Moscow's proposal that the formula of unconditional surrender should be revised. By contrast, the Soviets’ entire political struggle is directed against Poland. This obstacle, blocking their way on their march to Europe, must be removed so that the march can go forward. As long as the Polish question is not resolved in accordance with the Soviets’ wishes, they cannot push further politically.

The road through Warsaw leads not only to communist Berlin, but also to communist Paris and London. As long as this moral bulwark remains standing, the rest of the world will remain at peace. If this entrenchment were to fall, only then would the capitals of the Western powers realize how much had been lost. Poland’s resistance is not really the cause for the Allies’ problems and worries. On the contrary, the troubles and worries of the Western powers would only begin if Poland succumbed.

It is Poland's resistance that delays Russia's demand for control of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, its demand for a naval base at Basra, its demand for a dominant voice in a defeated Germany, its demand for a dominant voice in Europe. All these lines of further Soviet political assault have already been marked in various forms. But as long as Poland's resistance has not been broken, the whole effort of Soviet propaganda and diplomacy is focused against Poland.

The history of September 1939 repeats itself: in order to go further Hitler had to go through a knocked-down Poland.

The destruction of Poland must be regarded by the Soviets as the most important point for the conquest of Europe, since the military objective, i.e. the fight against Germany, has been subordinated to this political objective: the fight against Poland. For there is no doubt that the political struggle waged by the Soviets against Poland strengthens Hitler. No one can do anything about it.

If the Polish nation, which has sacrificed the most for the common cause of the victory over Germany and has done the most for this cause, is treated by its allies worse than their enemies, it is not an example which will encourage the peoples of Europe to fight against Germany. The example of Finland, the example of Turkey, the example of Hungary, the example of Romania show how much the allied nations lose militarily as a result of the Soviets’ political attack against Poland.

Why, then, are the Soviets delaying victory over Hitler, putting trump cards in his hands, subordinating strategy to politics and making the fight against Poland the main objective of their diplomacy?

Because – in spite of all appearances – for the Soviets the moral obstacle to overpowering Europe posed by Poland is more difficult to overcome than the physical obstacle posed by German troops. It is because of the justice of Poland’s cause.

To deprive the righteous of what he deserves, to shackle a martyr of a good cause, to deprive of freedom the one who was the first to defend freedom, to treat as an enemy the one who by his own sacrifice shielded everyone from the enemy, to deprive of victory the one who made victory possible, to kill an ally – all this is more difficult to do than to defeat Germany, and it is not enough to have the advantage of numbers and means.

To destroy Poland – it is necessary to have something more difficult to obtain: the consent of the world to an outright crime. That is why the Soviets believe, and they are correct, that without subjugating Poland they will not be able to overpower Europe. And that is why they think, and they are correct, that if they succeed in subjugating Poland, they will thereby overpower Europe.

For if they succeeded in taking the Polish fortress, so powerfully defended by sacrifice and merit, by justice and law, then after such a capitulation no one in Europe or America would probably find the strength to defend other, less morally strong positions.

That is why, indeed, the road to Soviet control of Europe is blocked by Polish resistance. And this is why the entire Soviet policy towards hegemony in Europe today revolves around the question of how to break this resistance.

 

The attempted fifth partition of Poland

 

The fourth partition of Poland was effected by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Agreement. It is not an overstatement to say that the main object of the current negotiations between the great powers of the anti-German coalition is the fifth partition of Poland.

This is not a surprise. Ever since the partitions of the Commonwealth the Polish issue has been a major concern in European politics. Article 1 of the Vienna Treaty spoke of the partition of Poland. More than a century later the main achievement of the Treaty of Versailles was the restoration of a sovereign Polish state. The same is true today: the decisions made about Poland's fate determine the balance of power in the whole of Europe. Therefore, the question of Poland is the main object of diplomatic negotiations among the Allies.

These negotiations are held in secret. The British, American and Polish societies are not informed of the real state of affairs. Opinions are formed on the basis of rumors, hints, leaks, unreliable press releases, vague statements of official persons. And this is not surprising – crime shuns the limelight.

 

However, despite all the efforts to confuse the public and hide the truth until the irrevocable decisions have already been made, the state of affairs can be reconstructed with considerable probability. Below is our attempt to do so. If we deviate in any way from reality, we shall be greatly obliged to the official agents for official corrections.

Right now Soviet Russia is attempting to make the Western powers, Britain and America, co-participants in the partition of Poland.

The government of the United States has so far persisted in its belief that it is inadvisable to solve border problems in wartime. In view of this, the Government of the United States takes no position on the Soviet demands, offering only its friendly mediation to both sides, Poland and the Soviets, in the event of direct negotiations. The Government of the United States, however, gives no guarantee for the future, either as to Poland's eastern or as to its western frontiers.

On the other hand, the British Cabinet is seeking to actively support the Soviets against Poland. According to not so unreliable rumors, in Tehran Churchilli and Stalinii made a personal agreement to “move Poland two inches westwards”, as Churchill formulated it while looking at a map. These “two inches” transferred from the map to the living flesh of the nation mean that Churchill pledged to Stalin that the British government would make every effort to ensure that in the “future, better world” Poland's eastern border would be the border drawn by Catherine IIiii after the Kościuszko Uprising, i.e. the border of the Third Partition. For the so-called Curzoniv line is nothing but a literal repetition of the Third Partition line. In return for this suicidal concession to which Churchill undertook to induce the Poles, Poland was to receive “compensation”, a castle in the air, in the form of German lands bordering Poland. It has been forgotten that Poland demands East Prussia in order to protect itself against German invasion, not in order to open the gates to Russian invasion by giving up Vilnius and Lviv.

The Soviets are pushing for the partition of Poland, America is standing on the sidelines, and the British Government has turned itself into an instrument of pressure on the Poles to make them give their own consent to the partition and destruction of the Polish State.

The principle of “compensation”, to which Churchill seemed to attach sincere importance, is erroneous and illusory, which is shown by the fact that the British Prime Minister 1) did not obtain an undertaking from the United States to support the transfer of German territory to Poland, 2) encountered serious opposition to this idea in his own Parliament and society, and 3) lived to see Stalin declare Russia's claim to half of East Prussia, including Königsberg.

Thus, since the Tehran talks the situation has changed in such a way that there is no longer any serious talk of “moving Poland two inches to the west” – there is, instead, only talk of halving Poland to meet the Russian demands. In spite of this, the British Cabinet continues to press the Polish Government to accept the border of the Third Partition, now renamed as the “Curzon Line”, as the “basis for negotiations” with the Soviets. Translating this formula into ordinary language, it should be said that the British Government is now exerting pressure on the Polish Government to agree, on behalf of the Polish State, to the fifth partition of Poland. The diplomatic language about accepting the border of the Third Partition as the “basis for negotiations”, the “demarcation line” etc., only serves to distort the reality, and it is so clear that only fools can miss it, and only dishonest people can pretend not to see it.

And yet, despite everything, the key is in the hands of the Poles. Without the consent of the Polish Government the fifth partition of Poland cannot take place.

For such crimes cannot be committed in broad daylight, they can only be committed in the darkness of secret negotiations, to tell the world afterwards that the victim himself demanded to be killed. The creators of the Atlantic Charter cannot put their signatures on the act of the next partition of Poland if there is no Polish signature on that act. One should not give in to the cowardly fear that a Polish “No” will mean nothing in the face of faits accomplis. This is not true. Honor, law and duty still weigh too much in British and American societies to be overtly disregarded.

That is why the responsibility of the Polish government today is truly terrible. For the smallest weakness, the smallest concession, the smallest compromise on its part annihilates the future of the whole nation, and turns into nothing all the sacrifices it has made up to now.

The opinion of the Polish nation is clear. This year on January 15 the Council of National Unity and the Government Plenipotentiary for Poland expressed the will of the Polish nation in clear terms, addressing a statement to Prime Minister Mikołajczykv which said: “The Polish nation categorically and unconditionally rejects Soviet claims to the eastern territories of the Polish State, recognizes the inviolability of the borders established by the Riga Treaty and will never agree to taking away any part of Poland, and is determined to defend all eastern territories of the Polish Republic with all means available”.

These sacred precepts must not be lost to the Polish government in the complexities and entanglements of diplomatic gamesmanship. For it will then lose everything.

One must not “bargain” for the death of one's own nation. Whoever initiates such negotiations condemns his nation to death. It was with this in mind that Catherine II wrote to Ambassador Sieversvi on July 4, 1793, when the infamous Grodno Sejm, which approved the second partition of Poland, was beginning its deliberations: “It is necessary to insist on the appointment of a delegation to negotiate with you.... If, in order to reach such a decision, you will have to use alternatively promises and threats, take their content from the instructions you have received. If you consider threats to be more necessary than anything else, please make it clear to the Members of the Sejm that, should they delay the appointment of this delegation, you will break off the negotiations, treat Poland as an enemy country, from which tribute will be taken and which will be left at the mercy of the troops (a la discretion des trouppes)”. It was Sievers who spoke with Stanislaus Augustus. It is Edenvii who speaks with Stanisław Mikołajczyk.

But the Russian “instruction” is the same.

 

…

 

The Turkish example

 

“By their fruits ye shall know them”.

This biblical text needs to be applied to the outcome of the Tehran conference. “By their fruits ye shall know them”. It will only be possible to definitively judge the value of the Rooseveltviii – Stalin – Churchill meeting by the military and political results that this meeting will produce.

Some results have already been caused. These are examples, as it were, partially illuminating the secrets, inaccessible to ordinary mortals, of the discussion conducted inside the Cheka-guarded walls of the Soviet embassy in Tehran. Thus, we have the Turkish example, we have the Yugoslav example, and there will probably be other examples as well.

Let us consider the Turkish example today:

I am undoubtedly one of the least informed political commentators in the United States. I have no contacts with any embassy, nor with any “well-informed sources”. I know as much as the average newspaper reader knows. If a few weeks ago I made a conjecture here that after the Moscow Conference it was doubtful that Turkey would go to war on the side of the Allies, I was basing this conjecture on ordinary human logic.

Between the Moscow Conference and today some important political facts have occurred: the Tehran conference and the personal pressure of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill on the Turkish president and government. However, the Turkish stance has not changed. After President İnönü'six talks with the heads of government of the United States and Great Britain, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs declared in the parliament that Turkey's foreign policy had not changed. And the Turkish official press commented on this statement by saying that by preserving its neutrality Turkey did its British ally a great favor.

Why do the Turks reason and act in this way?

The answer a commentator can offer will, of course, be mere conjecture. This should be kept in mind when reading further considerations.

Why, then, did it seem improbable that Turkey would join the war on the side of the Allies after the Moscow Conference ?

Because the Moscow Conference discarded the principle of equality of the states. The Moscow Conference established for the war period and the longer post-war period the dictatorship of three powers: the Soviets, the United States and Great Britain. The Moscow Conference thus undermined the value of the treaty of alliance between Britain and Turkey, a treaty concluded on a footing of equality. Hence, the logical conclusion was that Turkey's going to war would be de facto giving up full sovereignty. And it is more than doubtful that any state would decide to relinquish its sovereignty, even if partially.

Despite the failure of Mr. Eden’s negotiations with Turkish statesmen, on the way back from Moscow President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill used their personal authority to induce Turkey to change its position. They were unsuccessful as well.

Let us try to reconstruct here – absolutely hypothetically – the arguments they must have heard from the Turkish side. It seems plausible that the Turkish representatives must have pointed first of all to Article 6 of the Moscow Declaration. Article 6 of the Moscow Declaration reads:

 

“The governments of the United States of America, United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China … jointly declare ... that after the termination of hostilities they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other states except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation”.

The Turks are sufficiently familiar with Russian diplomacy to understand the essential meaning of Article 6. If this article forbids the use of armed forces on the territory of other states after the war, it thereby authorizes the use of armed forces on the territory of other states during the war. What does this mean when translated into facts? It means that in the event of Turkey's going to war, the Soviets could, without consulting with Britain and America, and without even consulting with Turkey itself, move their troops into Turkish territory. It means that, as a result of the Anglo-American-Soviet treaty concluded in Moscow, Turkey's going to war would open that country to Soviet troops marching in, even without asking the host country. Under such conditions it is obvious that it is better not to be at war than to be at war. Because after the Moscow Conference for Turkey going to war would mean not only the risk of the country being occupied by the enemy, but an even greater risk of the country being occupied by the Soviet “ally”. The latter risk is much greater because it is clear who would expel the enemy, but it is not known who would expel the “ally”.

One can suppose with some degree of probability that the solemn guarantee of Persia's “territorial integrity”, signed in Tehran by the “Big Three”, was intended, among other things, to allay Turkish fears arising from the Moscow Conference. Otherwise it would be difficult to understand why, of all the Allied states, it was Persia – certainly the least involved in the war against Germany – that was chosen to be the only one to be promised territorial inviolability, a guarantee which was clearly denied to Poland, the first country to have gone to war. Persia's “guarantee” of territorial integrity, on the other hand, is easily explained if one supposes that this was the model of the “guarantee” that – with Stalin's agreement – Roosevelt and Churchill may have offered Turkey in order to induce it to go to war.

Apparently this “guarantee” seemed unsatisfactory to the Turks, since Roosevelt and Churchill’s negotiations did not produce the expected results. We understand the Turks perfectly. For the Tehran Declaration “guarantees” Persian independence, but does not, unfortunately, say when Soviet troops will leave Persia and whether they will leave at the demand of the Persian government. Instead, the declaration says that any decisions concerning Persia will be taken jointly by the Soviets, the United States and Britain. What this means to anyone familiar with Soviet methods is that the “agreement” as to the withdrawal of Soviet troops will not happen until the Soviets agree to it. And the Soviets will not agree until there is a government in Tehran considered by them to be “friendly”. But when there is a government in Tehran that is “friendly” to the Soviets, such a government is bound to urge the Soviets not to withdraw their troops from Persia.

In other words, to anyone familiar with Soviet methods Tehran's “guarantee” of Persian independence is essentially a prelude to the Soviets carrying out in Persia, sooner or later, a communist coup along Yugoslav lines. Therefore, in offering the Tehran “guarantee” to Turkey, Roosevelt and Churchill, perhaps without knowing it, were offering Turkey not only the prospect of war, but also the prospect of a communist coup. It is not surprising that such a “guarantee” was not received with enthusiasm.

This is the conjecture of how the Anglo-American-Turkish talks went.

It has to be said frankly that Turkey's position seems entirely justified, especially to us Poles. For the silence on the Polish issue that has fallen in Britain and America today has a terrible meaning. Perhaps for neutral countries it carries truer meaning than the speeches of even the greatest statesmen.

I shall conclude with one more remark. Who knows, maybe the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs is right when he says that Turkey's preservation of neutrality is a greater favor done to Britain than Turkey's going to war?

The Dardanelles in Russian hands would be a mortal threat to Suez, the British Arab possessions and India. Perhaps, then, Turkey is doing a greater favor to Britain by not allowing either the Germans or Russia into the Dardanelles through its neutrality than if it had given the Dardanelles to Hitler or Stalin by going to war?

 

The Yugoslav example

 

“By their fruits ye shall know them”.

 

One of the fruits of the Tehran Conference was the Turkish example. Let us look at another example – that of Yugoslavia.

What is the situation in Yugoslavia?

The Yugoslav state, as any other state, comprised both centralist and separatist currents and tendencies. This is by no means an exceptional phenomenon. In particular it should not be treated as exceptional by the Americans, as the United States have experienced in relatively recent history one of the most acute crises of separatism. Lincolnx had to forcibly, by means of a war lasting several years, overpower and destroy separatist tendencies.

It may be that separatist currents are stronger in Yugoslavia than in most other countries. There are historical reasons for this. The Serbian nation was divided between Austria and Turkey. Over the course of several centuries the two parts of this nation lived different lives. The Yugoslav nation was united by hatred of subjugation and a sense of a common origin, a common past. What divided it was the days, months, years, centuries of separate, distinct existence.

The sense of unity was undoubtedly stronger than the differences born under the foreign rule. The establishment of the Yugoslav state irrefutably attests to this. It would not have come into being at all if it had not been for the common will of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenians. Each part of the Yugoslav nation comprised more people who had a sense of community than those who focused on the differences. Perhaps this majority was not overwhelming, but it was significant, since the Yugoslav state was established not by conquest and annexation, but as a voluntary Union.

Who tried to cause dissent and exploit separatism in Yugoslavia?

Certainly, it was most consistently fuelled by Mussolinixi . The death of King Alexanderxii at the hands of assassins sent by Pavelićxiii was the tragic manifestation of Mussolini's efforts to destroy the Yugoslav state. We say “destroy the Yugoslav state” because the Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian groups are too few in numbers for each to maintain a separate state. Thus, Serbs, Croats and Slovenians alike can only avoid foreign rule if they can form a common state organism. Mussolini's imperialist ambition was to break up the Yugoslav state in order to open the way for Italy into the Balkans. After the conquest of the kingdom of Yugoslavia by the German and Italian armies, the aim of fuelling local separatisms was revealed in all its nakedness. The creation of an “independent” Croatian state ruled by Pavelić – a Croatia totally dependent on Italy and Germany – was irrefutable proof of what all those who fuel Yugoslav separatisms from outside are aiming at: they are aiming at the subjugation of the Yugoslav people.

While it was not strange that the enemies of the Yugoslav state exploited the separatisms in Yugoslavia, it does seem strange that Yugoslavia’s allies are playing on these same separatisms.

For what are the Soviets doing now? Exactly what Mussolini used to do.

The Soviets have based the expansion of their influence in Yugoslavia on Croatian and Slovenian separatisms. Communist imperialism uses the same means as fascist imperialism, and for the same purposes: invasion and conquest.

Direct communist influence in rural Yugoslavia is too weak for the Soviets to create a purely communist fifth column. Therefore, only its leadership and cadres are communist. The Soviets are trying to recruit more supporters by playing to all corrupted elements. The Polish American priest Orlemańskixiv has his counterparts not only in Father Kubszxv in the Kościuszko Division, but also among the picturesque Catholic “chaplains” whom Tito'sxvi partisans show to every American correspondent.

The Soviets created a fifth column in Yugoslavia using precisely the same methods that Hitler used to create his own fifth column. They provided instructors, they provided unlimited amounts of money, they dropped some weapons from parachutes. Most importantly, they gave this fifth column publicity. All the radio stations are “doing” Tito. And the London B.B.C. dutifully repeats it.

Mihailović has been fighting the Germans since April 1941. At the time Mihailović went into battle, the elements that constitute the cadres of Tito's bands today were already present in Yugoslavia. They were as few in numbers as they are now. Their small number is attested to by the very fact that Yugoslavia resisted the Germans. For the elements that Tito relies on today were also subject to Moscow's directives at the time. And up to June 22, 1941 Moscow’s directives recommended non-resistance to Hitler. If communist influence had swept over the majority of the Yugoslav people, Yugoslavia's accession to the Berlin-Tokyo-Rome axis would have been a fait accompli. Since this did not happen, it is proof that the majority of the Serbian people are not under the influence of Moscow or Berlin, and that the majority of Serbian people have been able to resist even the combined influence of both Moscow and Berlin.

We are now reading the news that the Soviets have “recognized” Tito's government and thus ceased to recognize the government of King Peterxvii . It must be said that this is not the first time that the Soviets have refused to recognize the government of King Peter. They did so when King Peter was in exile in London, and the Wehrmacht Field Marshal installed himself in the royal castle in Belgrade.

In fact, things look very simple. The Soviets are seeking to seize the Dardanelles. That is why they are trying to overpower the Balkans. In the Balkans in the first place they are trying to control Yugoslavia. Of course, free Yugoslavia would not accept Soviet influence. Therefore it must be imposed from outside. The present aim of the Soviets is to impose a communist government on Yugoslavia by foreign hands. By the hands of the Soviets and by the hands of the Western Allies.

It is easy to understand what the Soviets are doing in their own interests. What is incomprehensible is why the Western Allies are beginning to play along with them. And undoubtedly this is what they have been doing since the conclusion of the Teheran conference.

In order to justify the ambiguous role that Britain and America are beginning to play in relation to Yugoslavia, a strangest theory has been put forward here, in America. We have heard the claim that “everything that is useful is good”.

This theory is as old as time itself. Translated into simple language, it means: “the end justifies the means”. However, the present war is being fought with the aim to destroy the Nazi regime which is based on this very principle. It is therefore difficult to encounter it in the pages of American journals without surprise and disgust.

The theory that principles must be sacrificed for the “good” of a war fought in the name of defending principles indicates a serious moral imbalance. Even in football rules are not sacrificed for the sake of winning. Those who say that everything useful is “good” do not realize that they are willing to sacrifice victory for the sake of winning. For victory is not only the defeat of the German army. It is also the destruction of Hitler’s philosophy. That philosophy which claims that “the end justifies the means”.

If everything that is “useful” is thus “good”, why do the United States not propose to use gases to poison Germans in Europe? After all, German retaliation would not affect America. It would affect the allies, no doubt. But is Yugoslavia not an ally? If Britain cannot be exposed to a German gas retaliation, why is it acceptable to expose Yugoslavia to a Soviet political attack?

Britain and America have obligations to Yugoslavia. Moral obligations and treaty obligations. The Yugoslav nation went through a period of hesitation. During this period American diplomacy spared no promises to Yugoslavia. These promises were given to those who today represent the Yugoslav nation and state to the world. Nobody should forget that without bringing disgrace upon himself.

The claim that governments in exile “do not represent” their countries because there are no elections in occupied countries is deceptive. After all, even in Britain elections have not been held since 1935. Thus, there have been no elections in Britain for nine years now. We can add parenthetically that there have been no elections in Russia for nine centuries now.

After the Tehran Conference there was a turn in British and American policy toward Yugoslavia. This turn is to favor Tito and question the powers of the legitimate Yugoslav government.

This fruit from the Tehran tree smells of rot.

If the policy of Britain and America toward Yugoslavia were to eventually turn out according to Soviet demands, it would be a triple capitulation. It would be a formal capitulation – a blatant violation of the principles of international law. It would be a strategic capitulation – the surrender of control of the Dardanelles to the Soviets. And, worst of all, it would be a moral capitulation – going back on the solemn word that had been given.

 

The Czech example

 

The Czech-Soviet alliance is one of the results of the Moscow and Tehran conferences, much like Turkish neutrality and Tito's government in Yugoslavia. Prior to these conferences, Mr. Benešxviii attempted to visit Moscow and accept a position as a Soviet agent in Europe, but he was never successful. Immediately after the Tehran conference he achieved what he had wanted.

Therefore the Czech-Soviet alliance is also a fruit of Tehran. It is a very special fruit. For it is intended to show the whole world that the Soviets have no intention of keeping the commitments they made in Moscow and Tehran.

Mr. Eden, with his usual charm, declared in the British Parliament that he was “very pleased” with the Czech-Soviet alliance, but we must regard this statement as a purely diplomatic gesture. The fact that a handsome diplomat can smile gracefully even after receiving a kick in the teeth attests to the fact that he is a handsome diplomat. What it does not attest to is that he did not receive a kick in the teeth.

Here I call witnesses who will testify against Mr. Eden: Dorothy Thompsonxix and Anna O'Hare McCormickxx .

Dorothy Thompson testifies (New York Post of December 13):

 

“… this (Czech-Soviet) alliance is another failure of the Anglo-American policy preceding the last two conferences. Both the Americans and the British tried to prevent this alliance. There was never any reasonable doubt that the Soviet Union would shred any federacy and any current that could possibly be used as an anti-Soviet outpost. It is regrettable that – from France to the Balkans – we have misjudged the political forces and issues. The result has been a series of diplomatic disasters”.

Anne O'Hare McCormick testifies:

“The Czechoslovak government has a less secure legal basis than many other governments in exile. However, thanks to its unwaveringly friendly attitude towards Russia, it has better prospects for the future today than anyone else east of the Rhine. This is ... a striking example for Europe ... of the success of Soviet diplomacy. Whether it is also a success of American policy is another question.

...At previous conferences President Roosevelt himself spoke strongly against a return to a policy of spheres of influence and balance of power. The premise established in Moscow and Tehran was that after the destruction of the Axis.... the four powers would stand together to consolidate peace...; this heralded the abandonment of the old-fashioned and unreliable security systems based on mutual aid pacts.... From outside, the Czech-Soviet alliance looks like ... a return to the system which has failed...”.

Let us put things into perspective. The Czech-Soviet alliance is merely a paper pact. It changes nothing on the ground. If the Soviet army reaches the Czech Republic, then Beneš will be useless to Stalin. He can use anybody, some Mr. Puppet, the equivalent of Tito, Wasilewskaxxi and Berlingxxii . And if the Soviet troops do not reach the Czech Republic – then Mr. Beneš is completely insignificant. All his life Mr. Beneš has only mattered as someone's agent, once a French agent, today a Soviet agent. Mr. Beneš does not represent anyone or anything. Anne O'Hare McCormick was very gentle talking about it, but she was right. The Czech people have not given Beneš any titles, either legal or political. The legal titles are all held by Mr. Háchaxxiii . Mr. Beneš did not acquire any political titles either. To make this point, we will recall some figures. The Inter-Allied Information Office reported that during the four years of the war the blood tribute paid to the German murderers by the Czech people is a thousand times, literally a thousand times, smaller than the sacrifice of the Polish people: two million five hundred thousand executions in Poland, two thousand five hundred executions in the Czech Republic. This does not show Mr. Beneš's influence among his own people. Or maybe Mr. Beneš is using his influence to prevent the Czechs from fighting the Germans, just like Hácha?

Mr. Beneš's relations with the Slovakian people are even more complicated, and it seems all the more amusing that Mr. Beneš presents himself as the head of the Slovakian state.

We do not want to show disrespect either to the Czech nation or to the Slovak nation. They certainly deserve better leaders than they have had in the last quarter century. Mr. Beneš and Mr. Hácha are two sides of the same coin: giving up independence. Such leaders must paralyze nations.

Thus, the pact between Stalin and Beneš is not an alliance between two equal partners, or even an alliance between two states. It is a piece of paper committing Mr. Beneš to Soviet service. It is not an agreement that changes anything in the balance of real power.

But the Czech-Soviet pact has serious significance. It has serious significance as a blow dealt by the Soviets to the Allies. And that is what Moscow really wanted, rather than the “mutual aid” of the valiant Czech army.

Why did the Moscow and Tehran conferences take place? Because after Quebec, the possibility of a close Anglo-American alliance was beginning to emerge. Churchill had come up with this proposal more than once. After Quebec, he renewed it publicly with great emphasis. What is more, in a speech at Harvard he stated that the nucleus of this alliance, in the form of a joint staff, was already in place.

This is a “federacy” that Stalin fears more than a Polish-Czech federacy. That is why he agreed to enter into negotiations, which he had refused to do for two years. The Moscow and Tehran conferences shattered Churchill's plan. It was agreed there that there was to be a common European policy of the three powers and a general organization which would comprise all European states. Thus, the Anglo-American alliance was dead on arrival. The projected Anglo-American marriage was turned into a classic triangle.

And barely had the final terms of this contract been set in Tehran when the Soviets decided to demonstrate to the world that they themselves were by no means bound by this contract.

For what does the Soviet-Czech pact mean?

It means that there is no common policy of the three powers in Central and Eastern Europe. It also means that there is to be no general organization in Central and Eastern Europe – instead, Russia will build its own organization there.

The Czech-Soviet alliance is a public statement to the peoples of Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Yugoslavia, the Scandinavian nations, that the Moscow and Tehran agreements signify the removal of Britain and America from Central and Eastern Europe and giving Russia a free hand in this region.

The Czech-Soviet alliance translated into the language of political propaganda thus reads as follows: “Look – it is not true that there is a common policy in Central and Eastern Europe; it is not true that Britain and America have a say there. What is true is that we, the Soviets, decide as we want. They, on the other hand, Britain and America, accept the fact that they have no say there. Look – Mr. Eden is smiling”.

Mr. Eden is indeed smiling.

I think we have the right to laugh at him.

 

 

 

The excerpts presented here come from the book Hańba albo chwała. Artykuły o polityce Rosji (Disgrace or Glory. Articles on Russian Policy), Jerusalem 1945, pp. 3-8, 13-24.