Wojciech Chrzanowski

Note on Russia and the East

Presented to the British Government in October 1835i.

Russiaii, being great a power, does not live from day to day. Its conquests are planned well in advance, and one conquest serves to prepare and facilitate the next. A change of ministers does not bring about any change in Russia's external policy, and even a change of ruler causes only a slight modification. The Russians have inherited the spirit of expansion from the barbarian peoples who once inhabited the same lands and who invaded Europe and Asia several times. They now have the further advantage that from the European civilization they have acquired all the improvements in the art of war and those inventions and means which can serve to facilitate invasion. That possessive spirit which drives them to invasions is imprinted in them by their particular form of government and is based on an army which is very numerous and organized for conquest. This explains why Russia invades and seizes all its neighbors, one by one. Napoleon'siii conquests were faster and more spectacular, but they did not have the permanence that the Russian conquests have, because they were the work of one man and hinged on his individuality.

As the Russian conquests result from the spirit of the nation, they are all carried out in the same way, and if we consider carefully how Russia conducts one conquest, we can infer by analogy what it will do in the next. Without going into the details of the previous conquests, which could serve as proof of what I have said above, it is possible, as regards the East, to deduce from Russia’s recent dealings with Moldavia and Wallachia how it will deal with the rest of the Turkish state. The Russians captured Moldavia and Wallachia in 1829, declaring that they were occupying them only temporarily. Now they are sending hospodars, or rather governors appointed by them, to get investiture from the Sultan; they promise to leave both principalities, reserving only the right to have a garrison in Silistra and to seize the military road through these provinces, that is, to seize the two capitals and several intermediate points between them. By this the Russian Government pretends to satisfy the complaints of the European powers, and tries to convince the Sultan that he is still an independent ruler and that Russia is giving him proof of friendship, while in fact the Russian Government is only deluding everyone and remains the actual sovereign of Moldavia and Wallachia and of the fortress on the right bank of the Danube in Bulgaria.

Let us now look at Russia's dealings with Turkey. The Russians come right up to Constantinople and then leaveiv. By doing so, they also pretend to give in to the demands of the European powers, but they only retreat in order to seize control of the country all the more securely later. It is not in the Russian character to rush things (brusquer les evénements); they proceed slowly but surely, and at that time they had not concluded any alliances, nor did they have a second army with which they could frighten the other European powers and ensure their non-intervention.

The Turks, who had regarded the Russians as their fiercest enemies, started to welcome them in their capital, and some looked upon them as saviorsv . In the past, Muhammad Ali Pashavi , because of the faith the Muslims had in him, could be the point around which they could gather to oppose Russia's plans. Today, by delaying, Russia has given the Turkish people time to become disenchanted with Muhammad Ali. The fortifications along the Dardanelles had deteriorated so much that they could not offer significant resistance. Therefore, the main effort of the Russians after moving troops out of Turkey is to urge the Turks to fortify this straitvii . If the Russians are not caught red-handed, so to speak, if they are allowed time to complete their preparatory operations, there will no longer be any way to resist their invasion. What will the powers undertake if the Russians, under the guise of giving aid to the Sultan against Muhammad Ali Pasha – who now only thinks of selling his cotton and repels the people with his rip-offs – occupy the well fortified Dardanelles? Then their fleet, shielded from any attack, will be able to bring in reinforcements very quickly. Even 50,000 troops will not be enough to drive them out of there, as the Russians will easily be able to bring a larger army there. If then the Western powers, turning away from difficulties and repeating: “there is no money”, “the opportune moment has not yet arrived”, will be satisfied with whatever explanations Russia gives and its promises that “this is only a temporary occupation”, they will allow it to settle there very firmly. For the Turks will do nothing by themselves, repeating their own phrase: “God is great”. After the seizure of the Dardanelles, it is probable that the Russians will push the Sultan against Muhammad Ali Pasha, providing him with all the necessary money to enable him to wage war. By doing this Russia would direct all the hatred of the Turks against the viceroy, which is an easy task, for in all nations hatred between parties is nearly as strong as hatred of foreigners, if not stronger. In this way the rest of the Muslim force would be consumed in this civil war. In the end, the Russian troops, calling themselves “reinforcements”, will be able to occupy the Turkish countries as far as they want and even put up a garrison in Alexandria. Having brought calm to the Turkish state, the Russians, leaving the shadow of the Sultan on the throne, will push the Turks to decline into softness and pleasure-seeking. The Crimean Tatars, a nation once so vigorous, are proof that the Russian government knows how to carry it out. As for the other nations in the Turkish state, they may be more faithful Russia’s subjects than many millions of people under Russian rule today. Not only will a Greek kingdom not be a bulwark of Europe, but it will itself soon become an easy conquest, and the moment the Russians capture Constantinople, they would be able to exert a great influence in this kingdom; this influence would be easy and natural, on a new government unfamiliar to the governed, in a weak nation, accustomed always to dividing itself into parties and quite spoiled.

Thus the Black Sea will become a Russian lake, and in time the Russians will gain the advantage in the Mediterranean.

The same reasons that the Western powers cite to justify the present inaction will also exist then to justify the relinquishment of these seas to Russia. To maintain a naval force capable of blockading thirty Russian ships at the Dardanelles, the number which Russia can increase annually, would require too much expenditure. On the other hand, the need for trade and its benefits exists on two sides, so the damage resulting from the interruption of this trade would not affect Russia alone, but would also weigh on the other side, and this half-hearted war, never leading to any result, would end up costing more than a real war, from which a favorable outcome can still be expected.

On the land the subjugation of the Turkish state will afford Russia military positions which will facilitate its attack both on Austria and on India. In addition, the captured Turkish state will give Russia a population that will supply thousands of seamen for its fleets and a hundred thousand excellent soldiers. It should not be forgotten that the ancestors of these peoples once crossed the Indus and may yet get there again, while the second Russian army advancing from Georgia would attack India via Persia. In that case it would not be necessary to precede this expedition with the conquest of Persia, as it has already been approved that Persia has been Russia’s fiefdom since 1827. This expedition to India, where the Russians would turn up as “liberators”, could be undertaken by them before the Sultan, following the example of the last Polish king, the last Kazan tsar, the last Crimean khan and the last Georgian and Circassian rulers, exchanged his palace in Constantinople for one in St. Petersburg.

However, it is difficult to predict the order in which the Russians will make their further conquests. For this will be greatly dependent on the circumstances, on whether Britain, France or Austria will allow themselves to be lulled into a false sense of security, or even, as it would not happen for the first time, allow themselves to be seduced into helping Russia to implement its plan, instead of uniting against it.

But it is certain that the Russians will always gain more resources for their further expeditions, and that the greater the delay, the more difficult it will be to resist them.

If the policy of the European powers continues along the same spineless path, the Russians, allowed to do anything they want with impunity, will come to rule the world. Then all the nations will be left with the sad consolation that Russia will one day collapse, subject to the law of nature that everything that has a beginning must have an end. But the day of the fall may be very remote, and even a vivid imagination could not enumerate all the misfortunes that mankind would experience under Russian rule and during the last vain attempts to reverse this rule or to break out from under it.

Istanbul, October 1835.

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On the need to be wary of Russia's actions

Memorandum presented to the British Government in March 1838viii.

While starting a war against one of its neighboring states, Russia never sets a limited goal, but aims for the complete destruction of that state and seizure of the whole country. Therefore, if this aim cannot be achieved in a single war, its hostile actions do not cease with the conclusion of the so-called peace treaty. It only uses other means to undermine the strength of that country, and as soon as it thinks it has sufficiently prepared its victory and the situation is favorable, it begins open war again. Just like in a battle, the columns go on to attack the next positions once the artillery fire has prepared access to them. Following this system, in the course of fifty years Russia has conquered half of Sweden and incorporated Poland, to Turkey and Persiaix it plans only to deal the final blow, in Central Asia it has subdued various lands, and the Orenburg line, which was the frontier thirty years ago, is now 200 miles away from the border; besides, it has extended its possessions in America, and only last year it advanced its frontiers there by a hundred miles.

There are attempts to explain Russia's expansion by the fact that up to now it has had to deal with uncivilized or weak and badly organized nations. Without venturing to discuss such a view regarding these nations, we may add here the sad truth that among civilized and well organized nations there is none which is not threatened by Russia.

The principal powers are: Britain, Austria and France.

As to Britain, admittedly, London cannot be threatened by the Russians, but if they are allowed to settle in Heratx , Britain will be exposed to their blows in India. I suppose the difficulty involved in the invasion of India by the Russians has been exaggerated. I am not sufficiently acquainted with that country to venture into details xi, but it is known that India has been invaded from this side more than once, and that formerly all Indian trade went through Kabul and Ghazna. I think, therefore, that the route taken by other armies can also be followed by the Russian troops organized for marches in the deserts, and I think that the roads used for carrying goods can also be used for transporting cannons.

In 1828 Austria proved that it did not feel strong enough, even though it is, to go to war with Russia on its own. The threat to Austria from Russia, which conducts Pan-Slavic intrigues and seeks to control all the Slavic peoples, is so evident that I need not point it out further.

As for France, it is now protected by the fact that Russia is so distant from it. Were it not for this separation (which might disappear as a result of a close alliance between Prussia and Russia against France), the collapse of the martial spirit and the factions tearing France apart would provide a great opportunity for Russia to exert a strong influence on that state, and a single war would be sufficient to change the existing state of affairs in France and cause that state to fall under Russian influence.

It is therefore high time the European powers started to be serious about watching out for the Russians and containing them. By agreeing to do so, they could undoubtedly build a bulwark against them. Britain could also do it with the help of the survivors of the various peoples who had become the victims of the ambitions of the Russian empire. The greatest advantage of enlightened governments consists in their being able to agree and act together; for if each has to fight separately, a half-barbarous nation is capable of mounting more resistance than a civilized one, with both populations being equal.

Last autumn Emperor Nicholasxii assembled a large number of cavalry at Voznesensk, displaying it to Europe, probably intending to amaze it with his power. In addition, three corps were quietly assembled in the Kiev and Podolia governorates, which, together with the cavalry of these three corps, which was part of the cavalry assembled at Voznesensk, constituted an army of 130 to 140 thousand men. Another army of 60,000 men was also formed in the Voronezh governorate. These troops spent the winter there. By ordering these troop movements, Emperor Nicholas may have had the following in mind: either an attack on Turkey with two armies, or an invasion of Central Asia with an army of 60,000 men, while the other army would look out for Austria and Turkey. If he has not subsequently changed his mind, a decree ordering the creation of trains for the delivery of food would be an unmistakable indication that Russian troops were about to begin action, and would at the same time indicate in which direction this action would be pointed. If the Tsar orders the delivery of oxen and carts in the Kiev, Podolia, Volhynian and Kherson governorates, this will indicate that the Russians are to invade Turkey; and if camels are taken in requisition in the Astrakhan and Orenburg governorates, this will be an indication of an impending expedition to Central Asia. Naturally, it is in Russia's interest to conceal these intentions and preparations from the eyes of Europe and to lull Britain into a false sense of security. If the British government learns of this decree at the time of its announcement, it will have about a month's time to take decisions and make preparations.

If Russia ventures to invade Turkey or Central Asia, there will be no room for half measures. Britain’s only choice will be either to allow Russia to achieve world supremacy and submit to it at once, or to become the leader of all the states resisting Russia's intentions and achieve world supremacy. The great difference between these two alternatives is that Russian supremacy would be based entirely on physical strength, while British supremacy would be based primarily on moral principle.

If Britain does not intend to succumb, it should endeavor always to be well aware of all the movements of the Russians. For if they do not undertake any invasion at present, the question will recur every year as long as the existing relations among the parties continue. Besides, Britain ought to take measures in advance so that it can act in time of need, and not believe the widespread notion that the Russians have no money to wage war.

What is said about Russian finances is partially true. It is also true that Russia needed monetary support to be able to put up an army of 180,000 men against France. But this does not mean that the Russians are unable to launch any invasion in the East.

Preparations for war require great monetary expenditures everywhere, but in Russia things are different. It constantly keeps its army and fleet combat-ready, and whatever is still needed to start a war, the government can acquire with paper money, as in Russia paper money is the only form of money in circulation and silver coins are a commodity. Even if there is not a sufficient quantity of paper rubles in the coffers at that time, the Emperor has the completely unrestricted right to issue Assignation rubles. Russia, therefore, cannot be in trouble about money for preparations for any war. Coins are only needed after the troops have passed the border. Then each soldier is paid l½ pence a dayxiii . When Russia enters Germany as a friend, it has to pay there for food for people and for horses, whose number in the Russian army is almost half of the number of people in the army. Food for a man costs, on average, 4 pence a dayxiv , food for a horse 8 to 9 pence a day; it is therefore necessary to spend at least 10 pence a day for each soldier. In the war in the East, food and fodder are brought from Russia, and the expenditure of money is limited only to the pay, which is less than a sixth of the sum that would be needed to maintain the same army in Germany. To this must be added the pay for officers and miscellaneous expenses. But in general, three million pounds sterling (18 million rubles) is sufficient to cover the annual costs of a war waged in the East with an army of 180,000 men. That is how Russia calculated the amount when it made Turkey pay the costs of the latest war.

Without going into a thorough analysis of Russian finances, it can be pointed out that the customs, the mines and the so-called Kingdom of Poland, where taxes are paid in coinxv, are the main sources of coin in the treasury. Taking any year, e.g. 1834, we shall see that the customs yielded £2 million (12 million silver rubles), and that extracted from the mines were 420 poods or 16,800 pounds of gold, 117 poods of platinum and 1326 poods or 53,040 pounds of silver. The tax on private gold and silver mines brought in 150,000 pounds sterling (up to one million rubles). The Kingdom of Poland, after deducting the expenses and costs of its own administration, contributes annually about 1 million pounds sterling (40 million Polish zlotys) to the Russian treasury, not counting loans, goods contributed in kind for the maintenance of the army in the Kingdom, extraordinary contributions, such as for an army review near Kalisz, for the upkeep of fortresses, etc.

Thus we see that although Russia’s finances are not in a flourishing state, yet when it wishes to wage war in the East, Russia can easily gather in coin a sum of three to four million pounds sterling (18 to 24 million rubles) a year. For waging an offensive war against Austria or Prussia in their countries, even this sum is not necessary, because, as is their age-old custom, in Germany Russian soldiers will easily find pay, food, loot for themselves and money to send to the imperial coffers in St. Petersburg.

March 1838

These texts were published as: Nota o Rosji i Wschodzie podana rządowi angielskiemu w październiku 1835 r., [in:] Wojciech Chrzanowski, Pisma wojskowo-polityczne, ed. L. Chrzanowski, vol. I, Kraków 1871, pp. 103-109; O potrzebie baczności nad działaniami Rosji, Wojciech Chrzanowski, Pisma wojskowo-polityczne, ed. L. Chrzanowski, vol. I, Kraków 1871, pp. 170-175.