Walerian Kalinka

Russia’s foreign policy

January 16, 1858

Emperor Alexander IIi ascended the throne in difficult circumstances, which required a great deal of skill and experience from the ruler in order to prevent ever greater dangers while there was still time. He had a war to finishii ; it had not as yet afflicted any of the weak points of the empire, and was confined to a siege of just one border town, but the defense of this town, lying at the distant end of the empire, required great sacrifices, and the war was becoming more and more severe and devastating to the state. The emperor felt that he could not emerge victorious from this fight; he wanted to come out of it with the smallest possible loss, and indeed he came out with an unexpectedly small one. Materially, Moscow suffered hardly any harm; what is this slice of Bessarabia and a few measly little fortresses, what is four hundred thousand soldiers and a few hundred million rubles for an empire comprising a sixth part of the world? Nothing or almost nothing compared to the disasters that might have befallen Russia had the war been conducted differently. But in this eternal struggle between East and West destiny once again spared Moscow; where superior brains were needed, blind fate brought together mediocrities on both sides, and they balanced each other out.

However, despite this unheard-of good fortune for Russia, its losses in moral terms have been far more severe. For two hundred years Moscow had been growing steadily; since the Treaty of Polyanovka (1634) it had not given up an inch of land to anyone, and since the occupation of Little Russia it had continued to conquer vast tracts of land. Even the least successful wars always brought it new provinces. After the war of 1807 and the disgraceful defeat at Friedlandiii, Alexander got the Białystok region from his own ally; after the quite unsuccessful Turkish campaign (in 1828 and 1829) Nicholas moved the borders in Europe up to Danube, and in Asia much farther than it could have been expected, considering the famous British prudence. And if such were the results of Moscow's unsuccessful expeditions, what can be said of the successful wars? Defeated, to hide the failure, it seized provinces; victorious, to proclaim to the whole world its strength and triumphs, it seized whole countries.

One of the Russian statesmen, Count Bezborodkoiv, during the debates at the Council of State whether to finally partition Poland or not, said: chto nie rastet to gniyet (“what does not grow, goes to rot”). I wonder what this statesman would have said about the treaty of Parisv; would not the surrender of this tiny fraction of Bessarabia have seemed to him to be a turning point...? Many Muscovites today shudder at this thought; this tiny concession in the south of the empire disturbs them when they think of the two hundred years of incessant conquest.

The present emperor, Alexander, who was brought up under the influence of sincere Russian patriotism more than his uncle and even his father, is acutely aware of this step backwards and is determined to stop this retreat and restore Russia to the political importance which it had until the Eastern War. All Muscovites will easily agree on this subject: the emperor, the aristocracy and the Russian liberals. With a strange instinct, they will all assume and play an identical role; when necessary, they will put on the mask of moderation and disinterestedness, and it will cost them nothing to belittle and humiliate themselves at times. It has been part of the martial traditions of the eastern peoples to carefully prepare a terrible, unexpected blow to the enemy. When Napoleonvi, with his invincible army, was advancing further and further into Moscow’s territory, Emperor Alexander Ivii was heard saying: “If he beats us, we will retreat into the steppes, grow beards like in the olden days and return to seek retaliation”.

The first and most important step towards restoring Russia's political importance is breaking the Western alliance. Admittedly, during the reign of Nicholasviii , from the accession to the throne of Louis Philippeix , there was no official alliance between France and Britain. But there was always an agreement between the two courts to restrain Moscow. And Emperor Nicholas would use any means possible to disrupt this harmony of the Western states and to isolate France. In 1853, before the Eastern War itself began and a few months before the Franco-British alliance was concluded, the Marquess of Landsdownex said, “It would indeed be a strange thing if the Russian Emperor, by means of his own mistakes, brought about what he had fought against all his life”. Nicholas did not believe in the friendship between the Western states, so he went to war and exposed Moscow to great humiliation, and now both the emperor and the whole Russian foreign policy are working to recover from that embarrassment.

The dynasty reigning in France today is the subject of universal hatred in Russia. The Muscovite peasantry attach to the name of Napoleon the meaning of usurper, apostate, heretic, antichrist and similar nicknames taken from the manifestos and proclamations of 1812. The accession to the throne of the present Emperor of the Frenchxi was received in Moscow with a kind of strange apprehension. The mention of Napoleon immediately makes the Russian peasant think of Poland. It is a peculiar thing that no journal elaborates on these views, no one from the higher society has such notions and makes such suppositions; in fact, it is a common effort of the enlightened Muscovites to prove that Napoleon I most shamefully deluded, most miserably failed the Poles; only the Muscovite peasant and the Muscovite soldier have been whispering gloomily about the course of events since 1848: “The Frenchman has got back to his feet, he has strengthened the Turk, maybe he will even restore Poland!”

But the Russian government, overcoming its own and the entire population's resentment towards the Bonaparte dynasty, is making every effort to win the friendship of the Emperor of the French and of France, and in order to do so, there is no flattery that the Muscovites are loath to use. Here, in Paris, within their group they discuss every detail and criticize everything with malicious envy, but to the French they are as obsequious as can be, because flattery is the best currency here. They know their soft spot and galvanize their old resentment towards Britain. Displaying books on Russia and its national wealth, on its progressive tendencies and enfranchising the serfs, on its efforts to promote trade and industry, publishing pamphlets and treatises on the commercial advantages that might arise from close relations between Russia and France – all this is solely aimed at bonding the two nations by temporary ties of friendship, or rather at undermining the Anglo-French alliance. Finally, by involving targeted trading houses into the ill-fated affair of the railways, Russia has already entered into a financial relationship with Western capitalists, mostly French.

But underneath this policy of peace and moderation there is a suppressed desire for revenge. At times the Muscovites seem to let out a groan of lust for violence and savagery, similar to the whistle of a Cossack squad galloping to murder and loot! Paris tempts them, they are attracted to Paris, much like the barbarian crowds were once attracted to Rome, and their eyes light up as they whisper that the time is nigh when Cossack horses once again drink from the fountains of the Place de la Concorde....

Russia's policy towards Britain is very different. There is a widespread opinion in Russia that the Eastern War is only the first stage of the struggle between the two nations. The present peace is an armistice which can be broken any day. This is why Russia, while proclaiming that it is disarming, reforms the army and prepares cadres for the huge armed force being created by the enlargement of the reserve armies. Violent hatred towards the British flares up in journals and pamphlets, in salon conversations, on the St. Petersburg and Moscow exchanges, in the country estates, and even, and especially, among the people.

Some may argue that the struggle between these two nations is impossible, much like the struggle between a land tiger and a water hippopotamus. We shall reply: this struggle is not only possible, but inevitable, sooner or later, and Russia can only benefit from the delay. Disappointed in its hopes for Istanbul, humiliated by the latest peace treaty, the Russian government must pursue a new conquest as the only means of regaining its lost advantage. But while speaking of Russian policy towards Britain, before analyzing its intentions on the western frontier it is useful to cast a glance at the distant East.

The first indication of Russia's imminent action in this region seems to be the advancement of a considerable part of the army towards the Caspian shores, the enlargement of the fleet on that sea and on the Aral Sea, and the turning of the war movement towards the mouth of the Volga and the Orenburg lines. They simply say: Russia is thinking of conquering India, and they understand that an expedition to India is likely, especially with the present unrest in these distant possessions of Great Britainxii. It would seem to us that, even in the midst of the present disturbances, an expedition to India would be premature and ineffective, so Russia is not thinking of it at present. It wishes first to advance to the Indian borders, a position it has been endeavoring to achieve for quite a while, and we think it will soon attain it.

It is a well-known fact that Russia is separated from India by Turkestan, a country the size of Central Europe. Not long ago an honorary member of the Geographical Society of Paris, Mr Lemański, gave a beautiful talk about this country, and amazed everyone not only with the newness of his research and observations, but also with the purity of the French language cultivated on the banks of the Neva. Turkestan comprises several khanates, the more significant of which are the Kokan Khanate, the Khivan Khanate and the Bukhara Khanate. The most difficult task was to reach one of these khanates, as these countries are separated from Russia by a waterless steppe from the Urals to Syr-dariaxiii, stretching for 1,500 versts (1000 miles). But these difficulties no longer exist today; a few years ago (1853), the attack by the Kokans on Ak-Mechet (Fort-Perovsky) near the mouth of the Syr-daria astonished Europe that Russia had its fortress there, at the edge of the distant steppe, connected with Orenburgxiv by military stations. With such a foundation, further action in a fertile and populous country up to the ridge of the Hindu Kush becomes subject to the usual strategic calculations, which are easy to do and not very difficult to effectuate.

In our opinion, this is the second stage of Russia's offensive action against Britain, the effect of which will be that the Russian army will come face to face with the British army. The fight between the tiger and the hippopotamus will thus turn into a fight between the tiger and the lion....

The scope of the present analysis does not permit us to dwell on the probable consequences of such a war in Asia. It is also difficult to predict what the internal organization of India will be after the present disturbances have been subdued, and what armed force the British will be able to accumulate and maintain there. But in spite of this, there seems to be no doubt that the balance of advantage in Asia will shift towards Russia. The routes of the Volga, the Caspian Sea and the Aral Lake, the great ease with which huge caravans of several thousand camels can travel, bring Russia undeniable benefits. It is enough to review the history of all Russian expeditions to Asia to see that, despite the incompetency and bad faith of the generals, and in spite of the failed military operations, the result of each campaign was most fortunate for Russia. Moscow is growing and will long continue to grow towards the Asiatic lands; all circumstances favor its advancement in these parts, and Britain would surely be defeated if it confined its war with Russia just to Asia. Britain needs to accumulate offensive forces against Russia in Europe, and the very nature of things indicates what these forces are.

Let us now turn to Russia's western borders. Here the Russian policy towards its two neighboring powers is still based on the partnership in the crime committed against Poland, but further events have brought about a great difference in Russia’s attitudes towards Prussia and towards Austria. The Russian and Prussian courts have always been united by close friendship. Justifiably, the ruling house of Prussia feels obligated to Russia, to which it owes its right to the throne, but also the hold of Prussia and the fact that it has been numbered among the first powers in Europe. The Prussian state is therefore Russia’s natural ally. But on the other hand, Russia's strategic position from the west is not very favorable. In political-strategic terms, this Congress Kingdom of Poland is like a painful sore, forever open and constantly in need of healing. In order to strengthen this weak side, maybe Russia would prefer, in some favorable circumstances leading to a general change of borders, to cede part of Poland to Prussia, up to the Vistula river, in exchange for East Prussia with Danzig. The Muscovites often mention the loss they suffered during the Seven-Years’ War by giving up East Prussia, which they had already occupied. Empress Elisabethxv even had thalers minted with her bust in Königsberg! However, the Empress’ death halted for a while the Russian designs for conquest and saved Frederick IIxvi . Her successor, Peter IIIxvii, of German parentage and soul, had hardly ascended the throne when he withdrew Russian troops sent against Prussia. He changed from Prussia’s enemy into its ally, and this was the cause of his downfall. Catherine IIxviii retained some kind of aversion to Prussia until her death; Alexander I, again, adhered wholeheartedly to the Prussian dynasty, and the blood ties established by his brother and nephew strengthened these mutual bonds. In spite of this, today, much like in the days of Elisabeth, East Prussia attracts the Muscovites’ attention and seems to them to be in perfect harmony with the Baltic provinces, peaceful, loyal, but also of great use to Russia as the most beautiful jewel of the imperial crown.

There is only one case in which Russia's everlasting friendship with Prussia could be shaken, and that is if Prussia, as it has already intended to do, wanted to head some kind of German league, if the Prussian king, willingly and without external pressure, got on a horse with an all-Germanic banner. Oh! then Russia would raise its head, and, shielding its country from the plague, would punish her blundering ally by annexing countries as far as the Oder and as far as the former Slavic seat of Rügen! This idea is not an invention or a fantasy, for it was already on the table in 1848, when the West had become so disturbed that it would expect, fear and dream of anything at all.

Things are different with Austria. These two courts, so closely allied not long ago, now seem to be at odds with each other, and while Russia panders to France, Austria returns to her former alliance with Britain. Of the Muscovite nobility and of the Russian army it may be stated that both hate Austria as much as Britain. This loathing has its origin in religious differences. The Muscovite people have to this day retained a Byzantine hatred of the Roman Church, and in their view Austria is an exponent of Catholic notions and aspirations. Secondly: ever since the wars of the Bar Confederation, the Muscovites have suspected the House of Rákóczi of some secret intentions towards Poland, and it seems to them that this Polish question awaits them at every war on the Austrian border. Thirdly: the more astute diplomats accuse Austria of having drawn Russia into a war with Hungaryxix, and of having wrested from its hands the most terrible weapon. That weapon was the Slavic project. By taking up arms in Austria against peoples fighting for their independence, Russia threw off the insurrection mask with which it had deceived the Greek and Slavic tribes in the neighboring Turkey, embraced the legality enshrined in the treaties, and proved that it was ready to reach for the Slavic domains just as a conqueror. This duality of Russia’s policy, although in two separate states, but displayed among neighboring peoples living on the same great river, was the reason why the Slavic question has collapsed for Russia. The Slavic or semi-Slavic peoples in Austria, like those in Turkey, have realized that if the only change were to be getting a new lord, they prefer to stick to the old one, as they will certainly not benefit from the exchange.

Finally, Russia has found out that the greatest and most effective barriers to its eastern aspirations have always been put up by Austria. The only convenient operational line in any war with Turkey on the Balkan peninsula is constantly threatened by Hungary. The mere posting of an Austrian corps on the Wallachian border restrains Russia, as it is impossible for the Russian army even to cross the Danube. For this reason during the latest war, in the belief that France and Britain would not create an alliance and would not interfere in this matter, Russia boldly entered Moldavia and Wallachia, and would have gone further, prepared to stop Austria with Paskevich’sxx army that would march from the Kingdom of Poland.

These reasons mean that Russia is not far from war with Austria. It would rather have in it an avowed enemy than an ambiguous and very harmful ally. Such a war would even be very popular in Russia, because as its final result the Muscovites expect to conquer the last Russian land to attach to the All-Russian crown, the last diamond of the Russian lands! The Oder and the Carpathians, these former borders of the Lechitic monarchy, could in time become the borders of Russia. That is how the emperors will try to compensate for the irretrievable loss of Istanbul! But Austria has a certain means of defending itself, and although it is very contentious, Austrian diplomacy understands it very well and is able to use in a critical situation. This best means is resolving the Polish issue, honestly and comprehensively. Austria has a Polish army in its ranks, only without Polish officers, but these can be found. An eighty-thousand-strong Polish army, backed by Austria as an ally, entering the borders of the Russian Empire, would be far more terrible for Moscow than a Moscow army marching from Warsaw to Vienna would be for Austria. The result of the battle would depend on honestly solving the Polish issue. Which is not easy, because injuries make Poles wiser, even if they have forgotten the wrongs, and Austria is famous for its bad faith.

Turkey and Sweden, the two powers flanking the Russian empire, have always been Russia's natural enemies. Both have many heavy losses to compensate for and to both Russia is a threat. However, since the Eastern War, the position of these two states has become much better; what is more, in the present state of European alliances, Turkey and Sweden may pose great danger to Russia.

As far as Turkey is concerned, as long as the alliance between Britain and France lasts, Turkey must follow the policy of these two powers, and in the event of a new war with Russia, it will naturally become its theatre, or at least one of its theatres. In the event of the dissolution of the present Western alliance, Turkey will always remain under the influence of British policy, because Britain, being in constant competition with Russia, in constant secret war, must do everything in its power to keep control of Turkey. Even if before the war Turkey's attitude to Russia was purely passive, after the war it had to change. Russia perceived this, and, fearing the exclusive influence of Britain in Istanbul in the event of a break-up of the Western alliance, it sought in advance to go against British policy, favored the rivalry of France, and opposed Britain in the matter of the Danube principalitiesxxi. But there is another reason why Russia was in favor of uniting the principalities. Russia wants to convince France that it has already renounced any attack on Istanbul; that, having retreated from the Danube, it has become indifferent to the eastern question, at least insofar as it relates to European Turkey, and therefore insofar as it is of direct interest to France. On the other hand, the arming of Russia in the Black Sea, the strengthening of Sevastopol, the closing of Asiatic ports, and, particularly, the incessant activity in Mykolaivxxii , should warn France that in this matter Russia cannot be trusted, and that because of one not completely failed expedition, the Russian emperors will not renounce their supposed legacy from the emperors of Byzantium.

And now to Sweden. The Eastern War proved that great overseas expeditions, which could not be relied on until recent times, have become, particularly with the present development of the steam ships, easy to effectuate. Russia used to think that it was only accessible from the west; today it sees the sea as its weakest frontier. But let us not think that this weak border is on the shores of Finland. Here Russia is firmly fortified, and only someone who does not know Russia would try to strike it a decisive blow in Finland.

Finland can serve neither as a reason nor as a theatre of war. Let us recall that for two centuries this country was averse to Swedish rule and longed for some kind of independence. Today the Finns do not dream of their own independence, and their material existence under Russian rule is far better than it was under Swedish governance. The Russian emperors, having made Finland a sort of cover for themselves, armed its shores with all diligence, and disarmed its inhabitants with the gentleness and wisdom of their rule. Finland, as is well known, has separate borders, a separate senate, separate administrative and judicial institutions, and its own schools. In the array of imperial titles, the Grand Duchy of Finland goes right after the Kingdom of Poland. Its language, religion, customs and laws have been respected by the Russian government. The Muscovites were very pleased when the efforts of the allies in the last war were turned towards this best fortified border of the Russian empire.

The southern shores of the Baltic are in a different position. Landing there is highly dangerous for Russia, as Polish lands lie close by. So it is of great importance for Russia whether Sweden will maintain its apparent friendship, or if it will declare war if given the chance. In the European balance of forces and military events, the Swedish sword has always weighed a lot; in a European war with Russia, it will be a decisive factor. If ever a campaign against Russia were to be waged from the Baltic, the Swedish mainland and the island of Gotland must be a military post, and Sweden becomes Moscow’s most dangerous enemy.

Russia is perfectly aware of this danger. Among the rocky coasts of Norway, in the northernmost Atlantic Ocean, lies Varangerfjord, which, like other Norwegian harbors, never freezes, and is so spacious that it can accommodate an entire fleet through the winter. For many years Russia, under various pretences, has tried to force Sweden to cede this bay. Its possession would ensure Russia's ability to keep its fleet for a whole year on the open sea. Britain knew of these Russian intentions; during the last war, together with Emperor Napoleon, it succeeded in inducing Sweden to conclude (on November 21, 1855) a treaty with the West, by which the King of Sweden undertook never to cede to Russia, nor to allow it to occupy, any part of Swedish or Norwegian territory. The signing of this treaty was the first overt declaration of distrust towards Russia on the part of Sweden, but at the same time it was also the most urgent reason for Russia to stop the war as soon as possible. For Sweden cannot, like France or Britain, start or stop fighting with Russia whenever it wants to; it cannot start fighting until it is assured by its allies that it is their firm intention to smash and crush Moscow's power, and thus to restore Poland.

And so, at every contact with a European nation unfriendly to Russia along the vast line of the western frontier of the Empire, the Polish issue comes to the fore. And just as no one from the West will be able to enter Russia proper without stepping on Polish soil, so every political dispute, and even more so a military struggle with the West, threatens Russia with our undying cause. The ghost of Poland, as in Shakespeare's tragedy, stands still, with a bloody wound, in the eyes of the murderer, and takes away the peace of his soul, with this one word: “I am always here”.

Many new political combinations may be envisaged for the future: Russia's attitude to the European states may change; the Western alliance, so dangerous to Moscow, may become unstable; another alliance, even more monstrous than the Holy Alliance, may be temporarily struck up; but at any place and at any time, the Polish question must be a formidable barrier for Russia. This Poland, which is not marked on the map of Europe, about which nothing is heard in everyday, current politics; this Poland, invisible to the material eye, so many times tormented, crushed, dismembered, strong only by the strength of its traditions and living only because of the fidelity of its sons, in the politics of the world carries the same weight as armies and powers, hinders Russia from gaining advantage in Europe, hinders it even from establishing its own internal organization. This is our posthumous history and our posthumous service to civilization; let us hope one day someone will take account of that!

In any case, Russia already takes account of it today, and does not waste a minute while crushing the remains of the life which gives it so much inconvenience. In religious matters, in the national administration and judiciary, in public education, in commercial and industrial enterprises, in the newly raised question of the peasantry, everywhere the Russian government, supported by the help of the whole nation, is at war with us to the death. As the main target of its attacks it has chosen the nobility and the Catholic clergy, in whom it sees the Polish identity most firmly established. In this relentless fight, Russia is changing its means and weapons: sometimes it uses violence, crushes, destroys and shatters everything that resembles a shadow of our homeland; then again, resorting to Greek ploys, it pleases and seduces with gentle appearances, but in its suppressive war it never relents, because its time is near and its future uncertain.

We do not need to hide the fact that the forces of the enemy are overwhelming, and that often the fight seems too unfair. And yet we do not lose hope. Because we can use moral strength against animal violence, faith in God's mercy against indifference, even of the whole world, truth and purity of our aspirations against Moscow’s lies and tricks. With such foundations for our life and activity, we can be calm and patient.

At the outset of the Eastern War the Muscovites minted a medal on which these words were sacrilegiously inscribed: “O Lord my God, in Thee do I put my trust; keep me from damnation!” This is not Moscow's emblem but our own, and under it we shall endure to the end. For in invoking the help of the Holy Name, we do not wish harm to our neighbor, nor do we blaspheme the omnipotence of God!

The excerpt presented here comes from the text Rząd rosyjski (The Russian Government) in W. Kalinka, Pisma pomniejsze, vol. 3, part I, Kraków 1892, pp. 104-121. It was first published in Wiadomości Polskie and then issued as a separate booklet (Paris 1858).